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INFORMATION, DECISION MAKING AND ENROLLMENT MANAGEMENT IN A 
PUBLIC RESEARCH UNIVERSITY: A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS USING 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY THEORY  
 
 
Thomas J. Riley, Ed.D. 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007 
 
Organization theorists have argued that organizations in higher education have difficulty making 
decisions that effectively address or change their environment.  They have been characterized as 
loosely coupled structures that have difficulty in decision making to solve problems.  This study 
examined the decision making process of enrollment planners at a large public research 
university in response to an enrollment crisis in the first half of the 1990’s that affected the 
flagship campus and many of its satellite campuses.   
 
 The theoretical framework is Herbert Simon’s theory of Bounded Rationality and 
the anarchic (or garbage can) decision making model created by James March, Michael Cohen 
and Johan Olsen.  Simon theorized that many problems are surrounded by complex amounts of 
information needs and a variety of possible responses that make decision making problematic.  
Calculating what response or action is optimal can be unfeasible because of the degree of 
complexity involved.  Simon called this a theory of Bounded Rationality.  In a departure from 
more orderly models of organizational decision making, Cohen, March and Olsen suggested a 
more radical interpretation of organizations as organized anarchies.   The "Garbage Can" model 
was originally formulated in the context of the operation of universities and their many inter-
departmental communications problems. 
 iv 
One of the most important factors influencing decisions is the management, 
dissemination and analysis of information.  An intrinsic component of the management of 
information is communication.  Analyses of the information management and communications 
processes were key components of this study.  This research study assessed the overall quality of 
the decision making and suggested ways of improving the process.   
 
 The study described a “real world” decision making environment in a situation affecting 
enrollments at a major research university.  In the search of higher education administration 
literature on decision making, there seemed to be a paucity of case studies similar to this one.  
Therefore, it proffers a description of what may happen when decision makers fail to realize the 
complexities and limitations of human and organizational capabilities in a turbulent environment.   
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1.0  CHAPTER 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND SITUATION 
From the fall of the academic year of 1990-91 to 1995-96, Darwin University (Darwin is a 
pseudonym for a large public research university in a northern industrial state) and the 
Commonwealth Education System (CES) of the Darwin University experienced enrollment 
declines at 14 of its 18 campuses.  Of these campuses six experienced dramatic enrollment 
losses.  These declining enrollments coincided with a national economic recession (1992) and a 
significant demographic decline in Northern high school graduates (Holsworth, 1989, 1990, 
1991, 1993, 1995; Esteban, personal communication, June 1, 1992).  Enrollment analysts and 
demographic forecasters did not anticipate this economic recession with attendant high 
unemployment.    
Initially, campus and university enrollment planners and decision makers were at a loss to 
explain and ultimately understand these declines.  Enrollment declines had a serious impact on 
campus and Commonwealth Educational System budgets.  They also resulted in faculty and staff 
furloughs and curtailment of student services.  Under these conditions, campus admissions 
offices were under increased pressure to recruit and admit new students.  In some cases, 
admissions office budgets were reduced as the demands on these offices increased.   In addition, 
morale declined among admissions officers system-wide.   
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While planners had not expected such a decline, an annual internal report had projected a 
downturn in high school graduates during this time period.  This report originated from the office 
of budget and planning in Old Main at Darwin (Holsworth, 1989).  It stated the decline would be 
most severe in southwestern, northwestern and northeastern Northern.  It is not clear however if 
some campus and university decision makers were aware of this report and others like it.  Also, 
there were other sources of information that corroborated the Holsworth projections.   University 
decision makers made decisions that appeared on the surface to respond to the admission 
application and enrollment shortfalls.  In an attempt, to increase enrollments, the Commonwealth 
Education System (CES) reduced out-of-state tuition for campuses (Arnold, 1993).  The results 
of these decisions would have little effect and in some cases created morale and administrative 
difficulties.  These declines were more rooted in the external environment and circumstances.  
Table 1 below indicates the freshmen enrollment decline that began in the fall of the academic 
year of 1990-91 and continued until the fall of the academic year of 1995-96.  
 
Table 1. Darwin University Freshmen Enrollments 1990-1995 
(Undergraduate Admissions Office, Darwin University, 1995) 
 
Darwin 
University 
Undergraduate 
Admissions 
Office  
Freshmen 
Enrollments 
1990 
Freshmen 
Enrolled 
1991  
Freshmen 
Enrolled 
1992 
Freshmen 
Enrolled 
1993 
Freshmen 
Enrolled 
1994 
Freshmen  
 Enrolled 
1995 
Freshmen 
Enrolled 
CES Total 6,008 5,436 5,578 5,270 5,719 7,501 
Monroe 640 514 549 544 643 772 
Darwin 4,482 3,629 3,414 3,497 3,755 4,362 
Grand Total 11,130 9,579 9,541 9,311 10,117 12,635 
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One analyst reported, “The number of Northern high school graduates has continued to 
decline from its high in 1976 to another record low in 1994.  Over the last four years, we have 
seen a fluctuation in the number of applications and admissions to Darwin University.  Some of 
this can be attributed to the changing number of high school graduates and the portion continuing 
to college in the following years”  (Holsworth, 1992, p.2).  In figure 1, the total number of 
Northern high school graduates is indicated from 1976 at its height to the low point in 1994.  The 
number of high school graduates going on to college is indicated in the lower stack or red.  
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Figure 1. Northern State High School Graduates and Portions to College 1976 – 1996 
(University Budget Office, 2000) 
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2.0  CHAPTER 
2.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This study examined the decision making process of enrollment planners at Darwin University as 
they responded to an enrollment crisis in the early to mid 1990’s.  One of the most important 
factors influencing decisions is the management, dissemination and analysis of information.  An 
analysis of the information management process was a key component of this study.  This 
research study attempted to assess the overall quality of the decision making process and to 
suggest ways to have improved the process.   
2.1.1 Research Questions 
The research questions were formulated based on the theoretical framework of Simon (1955), 
March and Cohen (1972), and the case study model of Choo (1998). 
 
1. Was the information relevant to aid and support decision making? 
2. Were the decision makers overwhelmed by information and the complexity of the 
decision situation? 
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3. Was decision making typified more by clarity and consistency or by ambiguity and 
inconsistency?  What was the degree of coordination and structure in the organization 
for decision making?   
4. Since one or more individuals may monopolize the decision making process, were 
individual personalities more influential than information in the decision making 
process?   
 
2.1.2 Research Questions 
This case study is first and foremost descriptive. As such, it does not have the controlled 
conditions of the laboratory.  Conclusions about cause-and-effect relationships therefore may not 
be drawn.  Case studies may involve only a single or a few individuals and therefore may not be 
representative of the general group or population.  They often rely on descriptive information 
provided by various people, leaving room for gaps in detail about the situation or events under 
study.  Furthermore, much of the information collected is retrospective data, recollections of past 
events, and is thereby subject to problems related to recall.    
2.1.3 De-Limitation of Scope 
The focus of this study is the time period of the academic years 1990-91 to 1995-96 at Darwin 
University and the undergraduate admissions office and other relevant administrative units 
related to the management of enrollments.  
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2.1.4 Educational Significance  
The results of this study can offer some insights and direction pertaining to the difficulties 
involved in university decision making during environmental turbulence.  The purpose of this 
study described a real world decision making process in a situation affecting enrollments at a 
major research university not accustomed to such an uncertain environment.  In the search of 
higher education administration literature on decision making, there seemed to be a paucity of 
case studies similar to this one.  Therefore, it proffers a description of what may happen when 
decision makers fail to realize the complexities and limitations of human capabilities in turbulent 
environment. 
2.1.5 Definition of Terms  
AIDAA – Administrative Information Decision Aid for Admissions 
AIS -- Administrative Information System 
Alternative or Referral offers- Applicants If they did not meet the admission criteria for the first 
preference campus, they were considered for the second and third campus in order of preference. 
Branch/Satellite -- Terms for Commonwealth Campuses.  
CEO- Campus executive officer 
CEPO- Campus enrollment planning officer 
CES- Commonwealth Education System 
Commonwealth Campus -- term used for one of the 17 lower division campuses. 
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Community Recruitment Centers -- located in the three largest urban centers in downtown 
offices; primary function is to recruit qualified minority students. 
Direct offers- Applicants were allowed to choose or prioritize three campuses for admission 
consideration.   
Lower Division Campus -- campuses offering the freshman and sophomore year; all campuses 
except Capitol. 
Offer – Students who meet the admission criteria are accepted or extended an offer of admission 
to the university.  
Paid Accept -- student has accepted the offer and has returned a deposit ($125.00). 
Service area – The university system was composed of satellite or branch campuses located 
throughout the state.  Each campus serves a geographical area or service area. 
NOHEAA -- Northern Higher Education Assistance Agency  
UAO -- Undergraduate Admissions Office 
Upper Division Campus -- campuses which offer the junior and senior year: Darwin, Capitol 
and Monroe College. 
Yield - the percentage of students who are offered admission and who eventually enroll. 
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3.0  REVIEW OF LITERTURE 
3.1 ENROLLMENT MANAGEMENT 
The individual most often credited with inventing and developing the term and concept of 
enrollment management was John Maguire, the former dean of admissions at Boston College 
from 1971 to 1982.  He told one interviewer: 
 
“But what enrollment management really is—data-driven decision making and 
fact-based management, linking people and resources to get it done in the area of higher 
education marketing. It’s not a euphemism for marketing, but some might think of it as 
that. We were coupling admissions, financial aid, retention, registrar, student flow, 
information systems and research, market research, and strategic pricing into a package 
that would allow interactive effects and generate an ideal outcome” (Helms, 2003, 
p.33).   
 
In 1976, Alan Cartter of the California State University at Long Beach was possibly the 
first to write about the impending decline in the number of traditional-age college students 
(Hossler and Hoezee, 2001).  Carter was an early proponent of the need to collect data about 
student markets and to understand demographics for better planning for short and long-term 
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enrollment changes.  The theory of enrollment management developed and evolved from the late 
1970s as a response to the higher degree of volatility in enrollments in institutions of higher 
education.  As a result, colleges and universities increasingly focused their attention on attracting 
and retaining students.  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, college admissions professionals began 
to consciously borrow concepts, ideas, and research techniques from the proprietary and not-for-
profit marketing literature.  Philip Kotler’s (1976) book, Marketing for Nonprofit Organizations 
quickly became a primary resource for many admissions professionals (Hossler, 2000) 
Enrollment management has been called a "rational model grounded in fairly expansively 
documented theory" (Graff 1986), "an umbrella term" (Kemerer, Baldridge and Green, 1982), 
and "a plan addressing administrative structure" (Kreutner and Godfrey, 1980-81; Hossler, 
1986).  The common thread through all definitions of enrollment management is that it is a 
coordinated, institution-wide effort. It involves a wide variety of areas within the institution. In 
addition to admissions, marketing, and financial aid, functions such as academic advising, 
retention, academic planning, career services, alumni relations, and development are integral to 
successful enrollment management (Penn, 1999).  It was viewed as an assertive approach that 
would ensure a steady supply of qualified students, with the intended outcome being 
maintenance of institutional viability (Kemerer, Baldridge, and Green, 1982).  
The population decline in the 1980s and 1990s had significant effects on the transition 
from admission to enrollment management (Bryant and Crockett, 1993). Their paper titled “The 
Admissions Office Goes Scientific” analyzed the change or transition from recruitment that 
included many marketing techniques that Kotler and many others recommended like advertising, 
direct mail, telephone, etc.  New technologies were being developed in the proprietary domain 
and it was only a matter of time until more sophisticated marketing techniques stepped over into 
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college enrollment management.   These new technologies ranged from geo-demographics to 
predictive modeling and neural systems.  Data and information now mattered as never before.  
One example of new approaches to the use of emerging marketing technologies was summarized 
in a case study of the University of Hartford (Connecticut) and it details some effective 
techniques using data analyses to monitor marketing, recruiting, yield, financial aid packaging, 
first-year and transfer retention, and other key areas. The importance of teamwork and a unique 
collaborative approach to enrollment management were emphasized (Krotsen, 1992).   
Beginning in the 1980s, the College Board started a publication that focused on 
recruitment and marketing activities from the perspective of admissions practitioners.  The 
Admissions Strategist was published to be a marketing and enrollment planning information 
source and to “address the diverse challenges facing today’s college admissions counselors.  
Written by admissions professionals, it covered all aspects of student recruitment (College 
Board, 1988).  Each volume covered various topics related to admissions, recruitment and 
retention.  Articles had the term “enrollment management” prominent in their titles.   
In the 1990s, new technology allowed the availability of more data and more precise 
analysis. New technology was being developed in the private sector by marketing software 
makers to more accurately target prospects.  Urban (1992) suggested that models from political 
science that attempted to identify "swing voters" could be usefully applied in college admissions.  
The notion underlying these models in political science is that it is inefficient to spend resources 
to gain the support of voters who are highly unlikely to be swayed by campaign efforts or highly 
likely to vote for the candidate anyway. Urban used multiple discriminant analysis to identify a 
large proportion of the total pool of admitted students (70%) at one institution who he believed to 
be the most susceptible to and appropriate for additional recruitment efforts.   
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 Without experts, institutional decision makers are often ill-equipped to grapple with the 
complexities of enrollment management. Admissions directors often do not get the needed 
support from the institutional administration because of lack of knowledge at higher levels, 
faculty ignorance and inadequate resources.  In many institutions, there was not enough factual 
and evaluative information pertaining to students from the perspective of marketing and 
recruitment.   
The availability and speed of access to large prospect databases and analysis software 
was a reality. As early as 1988, there was a growing ability to use desktop computers to manage 
prospect databases and do instant analysis.  John McIlquhan (1988) wrote in the Admissions 
Strategist of the growing ability to have a prospect database stored on a desktop computer that 
could be easily accessed and deliver research with analysis to any user.  By 1992, colleges and 
universities were able to create research reports on prospects and applicants from a desktop 
environment.  Institutional planners use the data that enrollment managers collect and report to 
help determine academic and nonacademic programming, building use, staff and budgets.  
Various aspects of enrollment management have stimulated interest in strategic marketing, 
planning, and quality (Hossler, 1984).  Despite the availability of demographic data and the 
experiences of elementary and secondary schools, institutions of higher education have been 
weak in planning for future students (Penn, 1999).   
One of the difficulties of enrollment management has been to have administrations’ grasp 
the critical issues and then manage and keep vigil over the various aspects of enrollment 
fluctuations.  Enrollment management is perceived as critical in difficult times of enrollment 
declines and financial crisis.  However, enrollment management is often ignored in times of 
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plenty (Penn, 1999).  In the face of predictions of severe decline, 42 percent of presidents of 
institutions in one survey in the early-1980s expected the institution's enrollments to increase, 
while another 32 percent expected enrollments to remain steady (Breneman 1983).   
It is common for enrollment managers on many campuses to be concerned about their 
lack of input into major policy decisions on their campuses (Hossler and Hoezee, 2001).  A 
frequent refrain is, “how can I have more input and influence on decisions?”  Administrations 
often perceive admissions directors as lower level managers or salespeople in the enrollment and 
budget planning equation.  The expertise and insights of admissions staff are often minimized at 
upper levels of the decision making process.  This could be a hangover from an earlier era when 
the admissions director was accepted to be an educator first and foremost. 
Enrollment management, although crucial to any institution’s financial and academic 
well-being, is still not well understood by many decision makers in many American colleges and 
universities.  Enrollment management is the sales and marketing department of a college or 
university in addition to being the gate-keeper.  For many administrators with academic 
backgrounds, sales and marketing are difficult concepts to understand and as importantly to 
appreciate.  College and university decision makers have not had the kind of formal training in 
marketing that is inherent to enrollment management.  As a consequence, these administrators 
often are faced with difficult decisions where they lack formal training, knowledge and 
experience. The complexities of enrollment management have grown in ways that many 
administrators could not have imagined ten to 20 years ago.  Empirical research and desktop 
computers have made fast and insightful numbers crunching possible. 
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3.2 ORGANIZATION THEORY AND DECISION MAKING 
Organization theory refers to the formal structures, practices and processes through which 
organizations seek to accomplish organizational goals.  Pfeffer begins his book with the opening 
paragraph stating that “We live in an organizational world.  Virtually all of us are born in an 
organization - a hospital – with our very existence ratified by a state agency that issues a 
certificate documenting our birth.” (1997, p.3).  Within the first year of our life, we will be 
issued a social security number by an agency of the federal government.  When we die, another 
government bureaucracy will issue a death certificate.  Simon (1997) defined organizations as 
the communications and relations among a group of human beings, including the processes for 
making and implementing decisions.  Organizations usually exist to pursue goals and seek to 
survive (Pfeffer, 1997).  Organizations have boundaries (Pfeffer, 1997).  Organizations are 
comprised of groups of individuals to attain objectives (Donaldson, 1995).  Organizations are 
coordinated to achieve goals that could not be achieved by individual action alone (Pfeffer and 
Salanick, 1978).  Organizations do not make decisions, people do.   
One definition of a formal organization is a system of consciously coordinated activities 
or forces of two or more persons (Barnard, 1938).   “An organization comes into being when (1) 
there are persons able to communicate with each other, (2) who are willing to contribute action 
and (3) to accomplish a common purpose.  The elements of an organization are therefore: (1) 
communication; (2) willingness to serve; and (3) common purpose. For the continued existence 
of an organization either effectiveness or efficiency is necessary; and the longer the life, the more 
necessary both are”  (Barnard, 1938: p82). 
  
 13
One theory interprets organizations as close or loosely-coupled systems whose individual 
actors create or enact the organizational environments and process information to resolve or 
accomplish goals from the information inputs from the environment (Choo, 1991).  This 
perspective first was suggested by Karl Weick (1969).  His view has similarities with those 
proposed by March (1994) and Cyert (1975) on the ambiguity and anarchy of organizational 
information processing.  
An organization consists of various groups, each seeking to further its own interests or 
goals, without any single group being able to completely determine what goals the organization 
should pursue. Group members thus look for allies in those groups whose interests are similar, 
and they negotiate with those groups whose interests are divergent but whose participation is 
essential. Each negotiated agreement between groups places constraints on what the organization 
can regard as an acceptable course of action: the goals themselves become complex preference 
statements which summarize the multiple conditions that any acceptable choice must meet. It is 
not surprising then that managers spend much of their time attending to coalition building, as 
decisions cannot be made without taking into consideration all the diverse and often conflicting 
interests. 
Loose coupled organizations often do not reliably display consistent decision coherence 
(March, 1994).  They face confusing and inconsistent environments.  The demands on one part 
of the organization are different and inconsistent with the demands on another part.  The purpose 
of de-centralization is to allow organizational components freedom to cope and solve difficulties 
in their environment.  Loose coupling through decentralization and delegation are designed to 
solve motivational and informational problems of coping with confusing and inconsistent 
environments.  The goal of decentralization is to allow various organizational units to have the 
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freedom of action to attend to different demands that may be unique to different components or 
functions of the organization.  The cost of such a strategy over time can evolve a process that can 
yield inconsistent actions that may be incoherent to organizational goals and functions.   
Moreover, decentralization and delegation generate a long-term dynamic of 
differentiation that accentuates loose-coupling. Sub-units develop their own objectives, 
information sets, clients, and identities.  They create sub-cultures of belief that are different than 
those in other sub-units.  These forces are well-known in the literature and are usually seen as 
pathologies or unfortunate costs (Choo, 1991).  This particular portrayal or conception of 
systemic inconsistency emphasizes internal coordination with a clear, shared objective rather 
than a flexible adaptation to the environment and conflicting demands.  An alternative view 
interprets loosely coupled inconsistencies produced by de-centralization and delegation as 
essential to organizational health, rather than as a sign of organizational sickness (March, 1994).   
Herbert Simon (1960) described the decision process as happening in phases over a 
period of time: finding occasion for making a decision, finding possible courses of action and 
choosing among courses of action.   The decision making process itself is characterized by four 
concepts which together form a theory of how these decisions are arrived at: (1) quasi-resolution 
of conflict, (2) uncertainty avoidance, (3) problemistic search, and (4) organizational learning.  
Expanding on the work of Simon, Cyert and March (1963) placed their focus on the processes of 
organizational decision making.  They seek to answer the question: how does a firm or 
organization behave as an information-processing and decision-making system?   
Studies suggest that individuals when making decisions examine only a few alternatives 
and even then do not consider all of the ramifications of those alternatives (Carley and Behrens, 
1999).  Simon coined a term to describe the notions of how decision makers make do with a 
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decision that is satisfactory rather than one that is definitely optimal and individuals and 
organizations “satisfice” (Simon, 1959); i.e., as a result, decisions are more opportunistic than 
optimal.   
Mintzberg (1983) identified three organizational designs: simple structure, professional 
bureaucracy and adhocracy. The simple structure typically is found in small organizations and is 
characterized by direct supervision and minimal technological systems with a dominating owner 
or an entrepreneur in control.  The professional bureaucracy characterizes organizations that 
traditionally operate in relatively stable environments and use predetermined “solutions” to client 
problems.  Examples of the professional bureaucracy are accounting firms or hospitals.  Third, 
the adhocracy often draws upon advanced technological systems and uses innovative, 
multidisciplinary teams to produce novel solutions to client problems. 
 
“Decision making in organizations is often pictured as a coherent and rational process in 
which alternative interests and perspectives are considered in an orderly manner until the 
optimal alternative is selected. Yet, as many members of organizations have discovered 
from their own experience, real decision processes in organizations only seldom fit such a 
description.” (Shapira, 1997, preface). 
 
An organization is not monolithic, but acts like a continually shifting multiple-goal 
coalition.  Managers, workers, shareholders, suppliers, customers, bankers, tax collectors, and so 
on all have a stake in the firm or organization, but their goals or preferences about what should 
be done differ.  Organizational goals are set by a negotiation process that occurs among members 
of the dominant coalition.  Each negotiated agreement between groups places constraints on what 
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the organization can regard as an acceptable course of action: the goals themselves become 
complex preference statements which summarize the multiple conditions that any acceptable 
choice must meet.   
The field of organizational decision making is not easy to define. Those who engaged in a 
conceptual definition have usually contrasted it with individual decision-making (Shapira, 1997; 
Butler, 1997), as organizational decision making entails multiple individuals–where issues of 
communication and conflict may arise–and multiple occasions over time and matters–thereby 
excluding one-shot decisions among unrelated players. Also, individuals may have conflicts 
based on analysis, objectives and multiple actors with an individual (March and Simon, 1958; 
Elster, 1985).  Figure 2 is a simple model of decision making.  It is generally agreed that decision 
making involves the four activities indicated in Figure 1.  Figure 2 is followed by Mintzbergs’ 
model of the decision making process. 
 
 
 
Search for 
alternatives 
Evaluate 
alternatives 
Choose an 
alternative 
Identify 
problem 
  
Figure 2. A Simple Model of Decision Making (Browne, 1993) 
 
Three Phase Decision Process (Mintzberg, et al, 1976) 
1) Identification 
a. Decision recognition in which opportunities, problems and crises are recognized and 
decisional activity initiated. 
b. Diagnosis is made and decision makers seek to understand the situation and determine 
cause-effect relationships. 
 
2) Development 
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a. Search for fast solutions or ready-made solution design or development of custom-made 
or modification of the ready-made solution. 
 
3) Selection 
a. Screening and eliminating alternatives 
b. Evaluation of choices or alternative choice to be implemented 
c. Authorization or approval to commit organization to action chosen in evaluation. 
3.3 ORGANIZATION IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
Colleges and universities like business organizations have mission statements, employees, 
management systems and physical plants.  Businesses are led and managed by professional 
administrators who have training and expertise, take a pride in their market sensitivity, customer 
orientation, innovativeness, and productivity.  Universities are frequently led or managed by 
professional scholars who have received on-the-job training as amateur managers (Birnbaum, 
2001).   
 
Institutions of higher learning have a remarkable resiliency for adaptation to a changing 
environment.  An interesting historical note and insight is that in 1980, the Carnegie Council for 
Policy Studies pointed out that if an observer used the year 1530 as a starting point, there are 66 
institutions that still exist in a recognizable form   (Cameron and Whetton, 1984).  The 66 
institutions are the Roman Catholic and Lutheran Churches, the Parliaments of Iceland and the 
Isle of Man, and 62 universities.  Universities have been described as uniquely adaptive 
bureaucracies and hierarchical systems.  These institutions have also been described as loosely 
coupled and fluid systems with a great capacity to survive volatile and disruptive environments 
(March and Cohen, 1974; Weick, 1976).  At the same time, colleges and universities are not 
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immune to internal and external threats.  The annual rate of closings and bankruptcies for 
institutions of higher education is higher than for business organizations and federal 
bureaucracies (Cameron and Whetton, 1984).  
The resiliency of institutions of higher education has been threatened by an array of 
characteristics of academic organizational decision making (Cameron and Whetton, 1984): over 
expansion in times of abundance, inadequate management controls, lack of collaboration and 
self-protection, rigidity in problem-solving approach and weak long-range planning abilities.   
 
Over expansion in times of abundance – In a study by Chaffee (1982) of small colleges 
responses to declines in enrollment, he found that administrators had difficulties 
responding to changes in their environment because they had significantly over-extended 
their resources.  During the periods of abundant resources, decision makers had built 
more and too many residence halls, hired too many new faculty and staff, and initiated 
too many new degree programs based on highly optimistic projections for student 
demand.  In a similar study of business organizations by Starbuck, et al. (1978), their 
findings indicated a similar pattern that was labeled “success breeds failure syndrome”.  
A common characteristic of these organizations was a long period of growth and 
prosperity that fostered over-confidence and over-expansion.  Business organizational 
decision makers became convinced that they were in a position of dominance that would 
allow them to withstand challenges of competition and environmental volatility.  One 
may call this an organizational hubris.  Managers tended to ignore early indications of 
changes in the environment and the market place.  They failed to understand 
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technological advances, changes in consumer tastes, and they failed to appreciate and 
honor the loyalty of employees and other stakeholders.    
 
Inadequate management controls – During periods of rapid growth, there are few 
incentives for tighter management controls.  Evaluations of personnel and resources are 
rare because there appears to be insufficient justification for a critical assessment in a 
period of such prosperity and growth (Cameron and Whetton, 1984).  Evaluations 
become intermittent, lack focus, and are often uncritical of personnel.  The financial 
situation and controls are vague and managers often are unaware of the true situation 
once decline has started.  Consequently, once managers are fully aware of the financial 
decline, their options for recovery have been greatly diminished.   
 
Lack of collaboration and self-protection – In periods of financial decline and 
retrenchment, effective responses and decisions require collaboration among internal 
groups.  However, any attempt to address staff or budget cuts causes inter-unit conflict.  
Various departments and units become more competitive and territorial as they vie for 
reduced resources.  The over-extension of institutional resources in prosperous times 
often inhibits effective responses in periods of decline.  Instead of a unified and coherent 
response for budget and staff reductions, individuals and departments compete in a super-
charged atmosphere of turf battles for a reduced pool of resources.  
 
Rigidity in problem solving approaches – Many decision makers in colleges and 
universities have little personal experience in dealing with a crisis that involves budget 
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and personnel retrenchments (Cameron and Whetton, 1984).  They are often slow and 
reluctant to respond and are often very cautious.  Decision makers are often slow to admit 
that there is a crisis and that there is a critical need to respond.  Many decision makers are 
unwilling to entertain conflicting suggestions for change or listen to opinions that sharply 
diverge from their own views.  These decision makers tend to rely on a small group of 
trusted advisers that would be supportive of their initiatives to address the need for 
personnel and budget retrenchment.  Very often, the result is that the causes of a crisis are 
misdiagnosed and innovative solutions are spurned.    
 
In one study by Cameron (1983), he found that there was a significant difference 
in how institutional decision makers responded to enrollment declines versus how 
decisions were made in institutions that did not experience enrollment declines. 
Institutions in crisis were internally focused, conservative in orientation and reactive in 
responding to change.  In institutions with stable enrollments, decision making was 
external in outlook, innovative and proactive in responses. 
 
Long-range planning is curtailed – A crisis causes a loss of focus and perspective.  
Decision makers and planners become completely absorbed by immediate problems that 
future direction is lost.  The cumulative result is a reduction in planning and development 
as the least adaptive features of status quo thinking become dominant (Cameron and 
Whetton, 1984).  The lack of innovative thinking and planning can cause morale 
problems as the most creative members of faculty and staff leave for better environments. 
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Student recruitment becomes stagnant as the campus loses enthusiasm to support the 
mission of the institution and its’ leadership.  
 
Often, college presidents probably have greater confidence in their interpretations of 
college life, college administration and their general environment than is warranted (Cohen and 
March, 1974).   The American college and university often does not know what it is doing.  The 
nature of the university is a loosely coupled organization populated by philosophers, football 
coaches, accountants, presidents, poets and managers.  More recently, Birnbaum (2001) has 
questioned the ability of the university or even business organizations to develop strategic 
planning that is effective.  Vroom (1984) reiterates the theoretical model of Cohen and March, 
that the nature of university organization and decision making is an organized anarchy.  Goals 
are often vague and in dispute.  There is an unusually high degree of task specialization.  
Administrators and planners cannot fully understand the wide array of skills and knowledge 
applied to the operation of the university.  Vroom states that colleges and universities are loosely 
coupled systems in which actions of one unit need not be tightly integrated with the other units 
and departments.  Universities resemble the model of organization labeled “professional 
bureaucracy” the term coined by Mintzberg (1979).   
Most college and universities are enterprises that still lack a culture of data in the fullest 
sense (Zemsky et al, 2005).  A large part of the problem derives from failure to resolve 
ambivalence about what data should tell and how data should be used in decision making.  
Official statements of mission and objectives are so vague and general as to be no guidance in 
decision making (Vroom, 1984).  Universities are more participatory in decision making because 
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of the higher educational level of faculty and staff (Vroom, 1984).  There is a need to develop 
shared conventions.  Strategy should be developed from data instruments (Zemsky et al, 2005). 
As institutions of higher education became larger and more complex, leaders and 
managers in higher education were being advised to understand and embrace strategic 
management and organizational structures similar to private enterprise (Cyert, 1975).  
Administrators turned to Keller’s (1983) popular book, Academic Strategy on academic 
leadership and management as perceptive in understanding how strategic management 
techniques could help deal with future uncertainties and how a number of campuses creatively 
faced hard times.  It was meant to be a handbook of discussion of the many problems facing U.S. 
higher education and the management strategies required to cope with them. Birnbaum (1991, 
2001) holds that universities can be improved, but that many change efforts are more likely to be 
disruptive rather than constructive. He has recently been critical of the scholarship in the field of 
higher education administration as unhelpful and limited in scope.  Cohen, March and Olsen 
(1972) have theorized that organizational decision making in institutions of higher education are 
best described by the “garbage can model” which is closely related to the adhocracy model of 
Mintzberg.  In a later paper, March (1974) stated that this model was most appropriate for higher 
education. 
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3.4 THE CARNEGIE SCHOOL 
The pioneering work of Herbert Simon led to a paradigmatic development in organization 
theory.  The Carnegie School approach culminated in numerous studies that emphasized the role 
of information processing and decision making as the basic elements in analyzing both the 
process and the structural aspects of organizations (Shapira, 1997).  The history of thought on 
organizational decision-making did have a “big bang” with the theory of Bounded Rationality 
developed by Herbert Simon (Grandori, 2001).  The theory was developed in contrast with utility 
theory, the dominant model of rationality available at the time, developed especially in 
economics.  Utility theory is characterized by rational decision making in terms of choices of 
alternatives to achieve maximum results and minimizing risk.  In contrast, Bounded Rationality 
theory stated that the environment is too complex and decision makers are limited by time, 
cognitive abilities and the sheer volume of information to make a decision for maximum results 
(Dequech, 2001). 
In 1958, March and Simon proposed the then novel idea that organizations can be viewed 
as information processing systems.  They pointed out that information sources and channels 
affect organizations' perceptions, intra-organizational conflict, and goal coherence. They 
emphasized the human limitations that prevent people and organizations from acquiring and 
processing unlimited amounts of information. They also characterized people and organizations 
as using programs to process information, a direct analogy to computers.  Later, Cyert and March 
(1963) described some programs used by business firms to make decisions about prices and 
quantities.  Two books from the Carnegie School, March and Simon’s Organizations (1958) and 
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Cyert and March’s A Behaviorial Theory of the Firm (1963) are landmarks in the field of 
organization theory (Shapira, 1997).   
 March extended his analyses in several directions and suggested that often decisions are 
random processes with the most well known being the “garbage can model of organizational 
choice” (Shapira, 1997).  The garbage can model (or anarchic model) of decision making 
theorized that organizations that are loose alignments as most colleges and universities are, do 
not have orderly decision making processes (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972; March, 1974).  
One of the prime stimulants for information is dissatisfaction within the organization.  Features 
of the communication structure within the organization will affect the kinds of information made 
available (Cyert and March, 1963).  In a garbage can model process, there are exogenous, time-
dependent arrivals of decision opportunities, problems, solutions, and decision makers.  The 
logic of ordering is temporal rather than hierarchical or consequential.  Problems and solutions 
are attached to choices, in large part because of simultaneity (Cyert and March, 1963).     
3.5 BOUNDED RATIONALITY THEORY 
Herbert Simon (1955) developed his theory of bounded rationality to explain what he perceived 
to be the current decision-making reality of modern information-age corporations and 
institutions.  Simon stated it in this way: 
 
       "The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
 problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose  
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solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world –  
or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality." (1957: 198) 
 
The concept of bounded rationality included several components and sub-models.  First, 
it pointed out that actors (either individual or composite) on most problems cannot acquire the 
information required for utility (value or solution) maximizing calculations, either because it is 
too costly or because it is cognitively unfeasible to do so.  Simon then distinguished ‘structured’ 
from ‘unstructured’ problems. In a structured problem, the actor knows what the relevant 
alternatives and the possible ‘states of the world’ are, is able to foresee the consequences of each 
combination of the two, knows what the value (or utility) of these consequences is for him.  As 
in the game of chess, the number of possibilities to be taken into account may be too high for the 
human (and computer) information processing capacity.  In unstructured problems, the lack of 
knowledge–hence the state of uncertainty–is more radical. The actor does not know not only 
what the probabilities of payoffs are but even what the relevant alternatives, or the relevant 
consequences, or even the relevant objectives are. 
Simon outlined especially one of these possible models, the “satisficing model” of search 
and choice. The simplest basic version of that model states that actors will accept the first 
encountered alternative or solution superior to a given aspiration level, ending a search at that 
point. If it is difficult to find acceptable alternatives, aspiration levels fall, if it is easy they rise.  
In that version “satisficing” would describe primarily a decision behavior capable of generating 
“good” solutions while reducing the costs of search (Grandori 1984).   
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Simon proposed that human rationality is bounded by both internal (mental) and external 
(environmental) constraints (Todd and Gigerenzer, 2003).  One of Simon’s major propositions is 
that the organization influences its member’s behaviors by controlling the decision premises 
(time, place, participants, environment, conditions, resources and parameters) upon which 
decisions are made, rather than controlling the actual decisions themselves (Choo, 1991).  A 
fundamental problem of organizing then is in defining the decision premises that form the 
organizational environment: "The task of administration is so to design this environment that the 
individual will approach as close as practicable to rationality (judged in terms of the 
organization's goals) in his decisions." (Simon 1976: 240-241).   
What precisely constitute the bounds that limit the capacity of the human mind? Simon 
defines a “triangle of limits”: the individual is limited by skills, habits, and reflexes; by values or 
conceptions of purpose which may diverge from organizational goals; and by the extent of 
knowledge and information possessed (Simon 1976, 40-41, 241). As a result, the individual of 
limited rationality, or the administrative man, behaves in two distinctive ways when making 
decisions. First, the administrative man satisfices - looks for a course of action that is satisfactory 
or good enough. Second, the administrative man constructs a simplified model of the real world 
in order to deal with it - the simplification is acceptable because most of the facts of the real 
world have no bearing on the particular situation being faced. (Simon, 1976; Choo, 1991).  There 
is a larger consequence of the administrative man’s bounded rationality: 
 
       "It is only because individual human beings are limited in knowledge, foresight, skill, 
and time that organizations are useful instruments for the achievement of human purpose; 
and it is only because organized groups of human beings are limited in ability to agree on 
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goals, to communicate, and to cooperate that organizing becomes for them a ‘problem’." 
(Simon 1957:199) 
 
Traditionally, these constraints have been seen as independent, leading to a notion of 
Bounded Rationality that is either the attempt to do as well as possible given the demands of the 
world – the notion of optimization under constraints – or as the suboptimal outcome of the 
limited cognitive system – the realm of cognitive illusions. In the arena of academic 
administration, Birnbaum (1991) put it a little differently in his example of Huxley College in 
How Colleges Work.  In his example, the purpose of decision making is to make maximum value 
decisions that will include all of the information, include all possible alternatives, evaluate and 
compare all sets of consequences and then select the best alternative. But, in the real world, 
decisions are difficult because knowledge is never complete.  It is limited or bounded in some 
way.  Huxley College is exceptionally complex, and there are many potential variables to permit 
any single person or persons to give enough attention to all of them.  Information that 
administrators receive through the various channels of communication at Huxley is filtered and 
distorted by individual perceptions of the transmitters.  Interactions between the various internal 
and external variables are often intricate and loosely coupled with potential outcomes or courses 
of action that are often uncertain.  Finally, the number of possible alternative courses of action 
for a given situation, are so numerous that they cannot all be examined.  
Cyert and March’s A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963) is a landmark text for 
organizational theorists studying formal models.  They demonstrated the impact of Bounded 
Rationality on organizational decision making and the value of process models for decision 
making (Carley and Behrens, 1999). With this work, a tradition began in which the organization 
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is modeled as a collection of agents (who are at least boundedly rational), organizational 
behavior emerges from the concurrent interactions among these agents, and decisions are 
constrained by both agent capabilities and the social structure in which the agents are placed. 
Bounded Rationality theory is considered descriptive of non-routine decisions and 
purports, therefore to describe what actually happens in organizational decision making rather 
than what someone thinks should happen (Browne, 1993).  Problems are often so complex that 
only a limited number of aspects of each problem can be attended to at any one time.  Because of 
this complexity, maximizing outcomes or solutions may not be possible and is replaced by 
“satisficing” of outcomes or “good enough” rather than the best outcome or solution 
(Browne,1993). 
3.6 DECISION MAKING MODELS 
The four most commonly described models of the decision making process are listed below 
(Browne ,1993; Grandori, 2001).  These four models have various aspects or elements that are 
often unique and contribute to the decision making dynamics.  However, there are more models 
than these but are less common in the literature.   
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3.6.1 Rational Model 
The organization has common goals and objectives (March and Olsen, 1978). Decisions are seen 
simply as the result of purposive choices made by consistent actors, and thus behavior reflects 
purpose. The rational model portrays the decision-process as 'intentional, consequential and 
optimizing' and assumes that an organization knows all alternatives, the probability distribution 
of consequences conditional on each alternative, and the subjective value of each possible 
consequence (March, 1988).  
3.6.2 Political Model 
The political model is characterized by organizational conflict and sub-unit coalition. The model 
has been developed largely from work by Cyert and March (1963), they argue that most 
organizations most of the time exist and thrive with considerable latent conflict of goals. The 
organization is therefore viewed as an arena of conflict, populated with “multiple actors with 
inconsistent preferences” (March, 1988), and divided or organized into “collective interest 
groups and sub-units” (Baldridge, 1971).  Management scientists have favored the political 
model in that it appears to mirror the decisional reality for the majority of businesses. 
3.6.3 Bureaucratic Model 
The bureaucratic model of decision-making dismisses some of the assumptions of the rational 
model as unrealistic. The bureaucratic model thus views goals as systems of constraints that 
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decisions must satisfy, with decisions seen “less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of 
large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior” (Allison, 1971, 79). 
3.6.4 Garbage Can or Anarchic Model 
The anarchic model departs significantly from the previous two perspectives in that the central 
assumption is that there are no clear organizational goals or objectives being maximized (or 
satisfied) through choice; and also, no powerful actors with defined or historic preferences who 
possess resources through which to seek to obtain these preferences. In simple terms, the 
anarchic model presents the decision-process as a virtual 'free-for-all', characterized more by 
randomness than rationality.  
 
Browne (1993) and Grandori (2001). 
 
1. Appropriate for judgment tasks in organizations where technologies are not clear. 
2. Involvement of participants fluctuates in amount of time and effort given. 
3. Choices are inconsistent and not well defined. 
4. Decision-making involves many types of problems and solutions and may be independent 
of each other. 
5. Problem, solution and decision-makers are not necessarily related to each other. 
6. A reliance on chance alignment of components of a problem, options available, solution, 
time, and external demands on decision-makers. 
7. Real world representation of non-rational manner in which decisions are made within 
organizations.  Many of these types of decision processes are ad hoc. 
8. This model is supposed to be most relevant under ambiguity or highly unpredictable 
consequences.   
9. Problems are worked on in given situations, but choices are made only when the 
combination of problems, solutions and individuals allow the decision to happen (i.e., are 
in alignment).  Consequently, the alignment of problems, solutions, and individuals often 
occurs after the opportunity to make a decision has passed or occurs before the problem 
is discovered.   
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3.7 ANARCHIC OR GARBAGE CAN MODEL OF DECISION MAKING 
In a departure from more orderly models of organizational decision making, Cohen, March and 
Olsen (1972) suggested a more radical interpretation of organizations as organized anarchies.   
The anarchic model is also known as the "Garbage Can" model.  The garbage can model of 
organizational decision making was developed in reference to "ambiguous behaviors", i.e. 
explanations/interpretations of behaviors which at least appear to contradict classical theory. This 
model was greatly influenced by the realization that extreme cases of collective uncertainty in 
decision environments would trigger behavioral responses which, at least from a distance, appear 
"irrational" or at least not in compliance with the global rationality of "economic man" (e.g. "act 
first, think later").  
The "Garbage Can" model was originally formulated in the context of the operation of 
universities and their many inter-departmental communications problems.  The garbage can 
model tried to expand organizational decision theory into the then uncharted field of 
organizational anarchy which is characterized by "problematic preferences", "unclear 
technology" and "fluid participation".  The theoretical breakthrough of the garbage can model is 
that it disconnects problems, solutions and decision makers from each other, unlike traditional 
decision theory. Specific decisions do not follow an orderly process from problem to solution, 
but are outcomes of several relatively independent stream of events within the organization 
(Daft, 1982).    
The term "garbage cans" suggested that organizations tend to produce many "solutions" 
which are discarded due to a lack of appropriate problems. However problems may eventually 
arise for which a search of the garbage might yield fitting solutions.  Organizations operate on the 
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basis of inconsistent and ill-defined preferences; their own processes are not understood by their 
members; they operate by trial and error; their boundaries are uncertain and changing; decision-
makers for any particular choice capriciously change. To understand organizational processes, one 
can view choice opportunities as garbage cans into which various kinds of problems and solutions 
are dumped. The mix of garbage depends on the mix of labeled cans available, on what garbage is 
currently produced and the speed with which garbage and garbage cans are removed. 
The notable advantage of the garbage can model is that it provides a real-world 
representation of the non-rational manner in which decisions are often made within an 
organization (Choo, 1998). Not all decisions are made in a logical, political, or even standard 
fashion. Occasionally, decisions are made on an ad hoc basis or by "flying by the seat of the 
pants" when the solutions, problems and individuals involved in the task happen to align. 
There are organizations or decision situations characterized by three general properties: 
problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation.  These are the characteristics 
of the anarchic organization and according to Cohen and March (1974), colleges and universities 
belong to this class of organizations. 
 
Problematic preferences- Organizations make choices without consistent, shared goals.  
Goal ambiguity is common.  Decision structure is often unclear.  
Unclear technology- organizations often do not understand their own processes.  Instead 
it operates on a set of trial and error procedures.   
Fluid participation- Participation varies in amount of time and effort devoted to different 
domains.  Boundaries of the organization are uncertain and changing.  Audience and 
decision makers change capriciously.   
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 Four streams were identified in Cohen, March & Olsen's original conceptualization: 
1. Problems require attention.  They are the result of performance gaps or the 
inability to predict the future. Thus, problems may originate inside or outside 
the organization.  Traditionally, it has been assumed that problems trigger 
decision processes; if they are sufficiently grave, this may happen. Usually, 
however, organization man goes through the "garbage" and looks for a suitable 
fix called a "solution". 
 
2. Solutions have a life of their own. They are distinct from problems which they 
might be called on to solve. Solutions are answers (more or less actively) looking 
for a question. Participants may have ideas for solutions; they may be attracted to 
specific solutions and volunteer to play the advocate. Only trivial solutions do not 
require advocacy and preparations. Significant solutions have to be prepared 
without knowledge of the problems they might have to solve. 
 
3. Choice opportunities are occasions when organizations are expected (or think they 
are expected) to produce behavior that can be called a decision (or an "initiative"). 
Just like politicians cherish “photo opportunities”, organization man needs 
occasional "decision opportunities" for reasons unrelated to the decision itself. 
 
4. Participants come and go; participation varies between problems and solutions. 
Participation may vary depending on the other time demands of participants 
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(independent from the particular "decision" situation under study). Participants 
may have favorite problems or favorite solutions which they carry around with 
them. 
 
Despite its representation of the non-rational, real-world manner in which decisions are 
often made, the garbage can model describes a less efficient means of making a decision.  
Decision making is considered a procedure for finding solutions to problems. Unfortunately, this 
often does not happen if the garbage can model represents the manner in which decisions are 
made within an organization. Problems are worked on in given situations, but choices are made 
only when the combination of problems, solutions and individuals allow the decision to happen 
(i.e., are in alignment). Consequently, the alignment of the problems, solutions, and individuals 
often occurs after the opportunity to make a decision regarding a problem has passed or occurs 
even before the problem has been discovered (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972).   
Some researchers following Cohen, March and Olsen argued that the early model was 
insufficient to capture actual organizational behavior.  It ignored the role of organizational design 
and the limits on individual behavior, dictated by organizational procedures such as those for 
data handling, and personnel hiring (Carley and Behrens, 1999).  Information processing 
theorists (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963) have argued that individual, and 
hence organizational, decisions depend on what information they have which in turn is 
constrained by the individual's position in the social structure (Carley and Behrens, 1999).  
Structure influences individual decision making because it constrains access to information and 
because the decisions, attitudes, and actions of those to whom one is structurally connected have 
a strong influence on behavior. Further, the structure of the organization and the task limits 
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access to information, determines the order of processing, and enables certain efficiencies. 
Moreover, the organizational structure can be viewed as a coordination scheme whose cost and 
performance depends on the network of connections and procedures within the organization 
(Carley and Behrens, 1999).  Organizational costs as well as performance is thus a function of 
these information processing constraints. 
3.8 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
Information acquisition and transmission in organizational decision making is an important and 
timely issue.  As organizations entered into the 1990s, knowledge became one of the most 
important strategic resources. Knowledge production has become critical to sustaining 
organizational or institutional stability and success.  The ability to respond to current and future 
changes in the internal and external environment requires constant knowledge flow within and 
outside the organization and a continuously updated knowledge base.  These new demands 
inevitably raise new challenges for organizational structure. The new focus is on developing new 
types of organizational forms to facilitate knowledge management, particularly knowledge flow.   
Wilensky's (1967) focus was on the development of intelligence or information that 
would guide decision making in organizations.  His view was that the more organizations 
developed in these terms, the greater would be the need for and existence of organizational 
intelligence, embodied in specific types of functions, such as “contact men”, “internal 
communications specialists,” and “facts-and-figures men.”  In particular, he was concerned with 
the way that organization routines, embedded in discursive patterns, would often dictate policy 
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long after it should have been evident that it was failing.  Even where strategic intelligence is 
available, it may be unattended to or, if it is, not understood.  Thus, organizational intelligence 
involves more than merely information: it involves also its application.   
New information and communication technologies are crucial to innovation processes 
and speed up the diffusion of intelligence.  Information technology is a major contributor to 
transforming organizational concepts of time and space. The convergence of computing power 
and telecommunications reach is providing new technological and information resources in a 
global, digital world. The development of information and communication technologies not only 
provides the means to process and transmit vast amounts of information but also determines the 
shape of organizational intelligence.  If information and knowledge are to be used productively 
and intelligently by organizations then organizational intelligence must translate into knowledge 
management rather than contacts, internal communications, and facts-and-figures 
(Wilensky,1967).  Too much information is too easily available so that the key issue is not 
gaining information but being able to manage available knowledge (Clegg, 1989).  
Information is data that have meaning.  Meaning arises as data are interpreted by sense-
making frameworks (Bruner et al., 1956). This sense making depends on what is already known 
as well as what data are available.  Knowledge is an accumulation of information.  Whereas 
information comprises a flow that changes rapidly, knowledge is a stock that changes only 
incrementally.  Some knowledge is explicit; other knowledge is tacit (Polanyi, 1966; Baumard, 
1999).  Tacit knowledge is singular to the organization. 
Organizations can acquire data by scanning environmental data sources, by adding new 
members, or through internal activities, such as accounting and research. Most organizations 
include personnel who specialize in various forms of data acquisition or information processing, 
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and large organizations have departments that focus on such specialties. Organizations convert 
data into information and knowledge by discussing the implications of data, by adding to 
databases, or by feeding data into decision processes.  They process information by altering it, 
integrating it, disseminating it internally, and interpreting its implications. Nearly all 
organizations incorporate rules and procedures that cause personnel to initiate actions or to halt 
actions when they receive information that satisfies certain conditions (March and Simon, 1958; 
Starbuck, 1983). 
Decision makers in organizations are often biased in their selection of information media. 
Many studies have shown that managers have a strong preference for oral, human sources of 
information rather than written or formal sources.  Mintzberg (1973) found in his study of 
managers in five diverse corporations that verbal media (ie. meetings, telephone calls, and tours) 
accounted for 78% of the managers’ time and 67% of their activities.  Managers prefer face-to-
face meetings and the telephone as information sources because they provide a high level of 
information richness the managers need to understand the social and hidden aspects of the 
problem, and to negotiate or persuade others with differing points of view (Daft and Lengel 
1984). 
Another integral element of decision making with implications for information 
management is the communication process.  Some research shows that communications in 
organizations reflect the statuses and aspirations of an organization’s members. People in 
hierarchies talk upward and listen upward (Porter and Roberts, 1976).  People also shape their 
upward messages to enhance good news and to suppress bad news.  Other research indicates that 
formal communications in organizations are generally problematic. Organizations slant their 
formal reports to win the support of employees, customers, stakeholders, and the general public; 
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and the members of organizations use formal reports to promote their careers or other interests.  
As a result, formal reports are permeated with misrepresentations and biases, and the 
organizations that take formal reports seriously are prone to run into trouble (Hopwood 1972, 
Altheide and Johnson, 1980).  Such issues make informal communication important.  For 
instance, Grinyer and Norburn (1975) found that more effective organizations pay less attention 
to the information transmitted via formal reports and rely more strongly on informal 
communication channels, and that more profitable firms base their analyses on information 
drawn from diverse sources. One of the prime stimulants for information search is dissatisfaction 
within the organization.  Features of the communication structure within the organization will 
affect the kinds of information made available (Cyert and March, 1963).   
It is agreed that despite the perceived importance of information, it is not always used.  
More accurately, evidence indicates that even when information is provided through information 
systems in organizations it is not always used even when available.  Henry Mintzberg (1975) 
wrote the classic study on this topic.  “Why do managers not use information when they 
apparently should?”  Mintzberg identified three reasons:  
1. Weakness in the information systems 
2. Structure and nature of the organization  
3. Limitations on the human brain 
 
He generalized about the non-use of information in decision making: 
1. Formal information systems are too limited in the type of information they provide in 
light of managers preferences for face to face and telephone.  
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2. Information systems tend to summarize information and lose the richness to the point 
where it becomes bland and unconvincing. 
3. There often is a time lag in providing information through formal systems that is too 
great given the speed of action required in most decision making. 
4. Power and politics in an organization may cause a manager to ignore or distort 
information received. 
5. Workloads may encourage decision makers to be action oriented and to use very current, 
informal and unreliable information. 
6. There are limitations on the amount of information that a manager can process in the 
brain. 
7. The brain filters information it receives and tends to screen out information that is at odds 
with past experience or that creates a cognitive dissonance. 
 
Mintzberg theorized further that the lack of information use is the fault of the manager or 
the organization and that organizational structures contribute to underutilization of information 
systems.  The decisional reality for many businesses, as March (1991) summarizes, is that they: 
(1) gather information but do not use it; (2) ask for more and ignore it; and, (3) gather and 
process a great deal of information that has little or no relevance to decisions. Information and 
knowledge must have forecasting abilities (Stinchcombe, 1990).  Organizations have limited 
resources, and there is a plethora of knowledge domains in which expertise can be 
developed.  Effective knowledge management demands a flow of knowledge, rather than a stock 
of it (Perez-Bustamante, 1999). 
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It is now widely accepted that data and information have strategic significance to the 
sustainable competitive position of an organization or firm.  An increasing number of 
publications in the current literature explain the value of information and knowledge and 
effective knowledge management to organizational specific performance.  Research articles 
describing different strategies for the management of information and knowledge are also 
beginning to appear in present day journals.  Although knowledge management, as an area of 
study within business and organizations, is relatively new, it stems from a number of mature 
business disciplines including strategy, information systems, the decision sciences, human 
resources management, and even from the more concrete finance, accounting and marketing 
disciplines.  Computer-based management information, decision support, and knowledge-based 
systems are increasingly relied upon to improve organizational decision-making.  The advent of 
electronic media based upon computer and tele-communication technologies has recently 
increased interest in the acquisition and transmission of information (Starbuck and Porrini, 
2001).   
Technological development has been accelerating.  Some of the current trends appear to 
be as follows: organizations are gaining access to more data more quickly. This has implications 
for decision making and for the participants in decision making.  The amount of information and 
the management of information are changing the landscape of organizational structure and 
decision making.  Institutions and organizations now have the ability to develop organizational 
memory.  Organizations must retain and remember important facts and develop internal (tacit) 
knowledge to stay competitive and ensure the well-being of the organization (De Holan,, Phillips 
and Lawrence, 2004). 
 41
3.9 A SHORT HISTORY OF DARWIN UNIVERSITY AND THE 
COMMONWEALTH EDUCATION SYSTEM 
Darwin University was founded in the mid-1800s as a publicly supported agricultural institution.  
It is a large, public, research university with 20 satellite campuses located throughout the state.  
The student body is approximately 67,000 undergraduate students and 8,000 graduate students.  
The university is composed of ten academic colleges and schools at the flagship campus.  There 
was also a medical school and hospital.   The operating budget in the early 1990s was 
approximately 1.3 billion dollars.  The university is a member of the Association of American 
Universities (AAU). 
In the 1930s, Darwin University created a series of centers throughout the state for 
students who, because of Depression-era economics, could not afford to leave home to attend 
college. The centers offered the first year or two of undergraduate studies and were the 
predecessors of today’s system of 20 Darwin University campuses located throughout the state 
with the Darwin campus as flagship and the administrative hub.   
The curriculum offered at the undergraduate centers consisted of courses in English, history, 
mathematics, chemistry, foreign languages, and other subjects that comprised first- and second-
year studies at the main campus. Ostensibly these centers were to serve other colleges and 
universities as much as Darwin University.  In practice, they did act as feeders almost from the 
very beginning.   
Toward the end of the 1950s, these satellite campuses were reorganized to prepare them 
to cope more effectively with the heavier demands expected in the 1960s and beyond. A new 
plan was formulated and approved by the trustees in 1959. The branches were more closely 
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integrated into the academic mainstream of the University. The campuses were then 
administered by a central coordinator who reported directly to the president.  The central 
coordinator position evolved into the position of dean and vice president of the Commonwealth 
Education System. 
The Commonwealth Education System (CES) was administered from the flagship 
campus with a dean and vice president.  Each campus had a campus executive officer (CEO) and 
campus directors over various units in academic affairs, student affairs, business and financial 
operations, and university relations.  The campus executive officer reported to the CES dean and 
vice president.  Also, each campus had a campus admissions officer responsible for recruitment 
in the service area.  Each satellite campus was responsible for a geographic service area.  The 
campus service area included communities, organizations, employers and high schools.  The 
campuses offered academic and training programs for service area constituents.  The admissions 
officers were responsible for recruitment and providing information to the high schools about 
Darwin University academic programs and admission requirements. 
3.9.1 The Enrollment Crisis Affecting Darwin University and the Commonwealth 
Education System 1990-1995 
Even with optimal promotion and recruitment effort and results, the campuses may still have 
fallen short of their enrollment goals because of the Darwin applicant pool size, demographics, 
economic conditions and other higher education alternatives.  When the undergraduate 
admissions office recruits for Darwin University, they recruit for all of the University.  During 
the early 1990’s, there really was no University-wide marketing and recruitment plan that could 
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effectively promote campuses to prospective students about all of Darwin University and 
especially the CES campuses (B. Snyder, personal communication, February 13, 2006;  J. 
Wayne, personal communication, June 16, 2006).  Few resources were available to underwrite 
such a concerted effort.  Also, the University enrollment management plan is predicated on the 
enrollment needs of the academic colleges at the Darwin campus (T. Jacobson, personal 
communication, August 29, 2005).  Primary consideration for admission and enrollment are the 
colleges at the Darwin flagship campus.  All other campuses in the Darwin University system are 
given second priority.  The Undergraduate Admissions Office adjusted the admission criteria so 
enough students were offered admission to the colleges at the Darwin campus to meet enrollment 
needs each semester. 
At a meeting of the  University Council on Enrollment Policies and Planning (UCEPP) in 
1991, the vice-president of the Commonwealth Education System (CES) advised council 
members that a number of CES campuses were experiencing large enrollment swings which he 
stated should be “on a more even keel” (Shaw, personal communication, October 27, 1991).  At 
this same meeting, Jeffrey Rochester, the director of undergraduate admissions informed the 
council members that there had been a decrease in Northern high school graduates.  He reported 
that enrollments were declining in the areas surrounding the campuses. His comments were 
based on a variety of informational sources and an annual report from the Office of Budget and 
Resource Analysis.  This report predicted high school enrollments and graduation rates were in 
for a downturn that would last into the mid 1990’s.  The report was researched and reported each 
year from an office in Old Main at Darwin (Newton, 1979, 1987; Holsworth, 1989).  The authors 
reported that the decline started in 1977 was expected to be worse in Northern than for the nation 
as a whole (Newton, 1979).   The 1987 report stated that the decline in Northern high school 
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graduates was 24 percent (Althouse, personal communications, September 22, 1987, Newton, 
1987).  The 1989 report predicted that the decline would be most severe in northeastern, 
northwestern and southwestern Northern (Holsworth).   
Some of the first indications of application and enrollment declines were evidenced in the 
associate degree programs as early as 1989 (C. Walker, personal communication, February 22, 
1989).  A senior administrator announced at the University Council on Enrollment Policies and 
Planning meeting that associate degree applications and enrollments had shown little increase 
and in most of the colleges and campuses had actually declined.  With the exception of the 
college of agriculture, each academic college had satisfactory enrollments and adults made up a 
significant proportion of the CES campus enrollments.   
Table 2 lists the annual baccalaureate freshmen admission targets and the actual enrolled 
freshmen for CES campuses from fall 1990 to 1995.  
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Table 2 . Summary of Approved Baccalaureate Admissions Targets 1990-1995: Final Paid 
Accepts (Commonwealth Education System) 
CES 
Campuses  
Fall 
1990 
Fall 
1991 
Fall 
1992 
Fall 
1993 
Fall 
1994 
Fall 
1995 
Allentown Target   190 160 155 175 
 Actual 153 148 122 146 162 175 
Alexander Target   880 900 915 900 
 Actual 810 839 888 878 837 1105 
Bennett Target   300 300 275 280 
 Actual 266 265 271 242 295 337 
Brunswick Target   550 500 500 535 
 Actual 362 312 479 447 507 582 
Dunmore Target   435 400 300 300 
 Actual 331 345 313 263 286 456 
Doyletown Target   190 140 135 110 
 Actual 131 139 122 102 101 133 
Flagler Target   160 130 105 115 
 Actual 106 117 123 88 96 160 
Hamilton Target   500 500 500 475 
 Actual 488 418 408 413 433 545 
Mechanicsville Target   300 260 250 250 
 Actual 254 198 221 226 210 278 
Mount Royal Target   280 235 235 235 
 Actual 260 212 198 217 227 274 
North Target   220 175 170 170 
 Actual 15 134 145 148 151 182 
Orrville Target   850 750 670 650 
 Actual  693 668 561 511 820 
Scottsville Target   225 175 165 165 
 Actual 191 168 129 133 154 201 
Scarborough Target   120 80 75 70 
 Actual   64 65 61 86 
Wyoming Target   240 210 225 210 
 Actual 187 142 177 186 178 191 
Wadsworth Target   250 220 200 190 
 Actual 226 165 181 175 172 225 
York Target   315 275 250 275 
 Actual 277 218 251 219 236 264 
Commonwealth 
Campuses Target 0 0 3310 2925 2720 2680 
 Actual 2757 2437 2474 2344 2446 3131 
Total Campuses Target 0 0 6005 5410 5125 5105 
 Actual 4917 4597 4760 4509 4617 6014 
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Tables 3, 4 and 5 list the applications, admission offers and paid accept totals by campus 
from fall 1990 to 1995.  
 
Table 3. Freshmen Baccalaureate and Associate Applications Fall Semester 1990 – 1995     
(Undergraduate Admissions Office, Darwin University) 
Campus 
Total 
Apps  
1990 
Total 
Apps  
1991 
Total 
Apps  
1992* 
Total 
Apps  
1993 
Total 
Apps  
1994 
Total 
Apps  
1995 
Alexander 2873 2,706 3,123 2,703 2,451 3,366 
Allentown 467 513 467 459 448 477 
Brunswick 1175 1,017 1,529 1,331 1,408 1,707 
Bennett 915 697 927 703 730 809 
Dunmore 1152 1169 1093 928 952 1328 
Doyletown 352 392 352 306 353 402 
Flagler 260 281 291 246 249 358 
Hamilton 1,535 1,272 1,368 1,295 1,286 1,689 
Mount Royal 788 590 912 655 701 824 
Mechanicsville 772 588 813 519 506 618 
North  464 434 474 451 426 481 
Orrville 2111 2,216 2,266 1,964 1,847 2,304 
Scottsville 597 542 601 403 453 526 
Scarborough 
Valley 191 240 203 201 201 226 
Wyoming 516 489 542 600 580 520 
Wadsworth  674 573 595 603 526 609 
York 688 673 674 625 642 662 
CWC Total 15,530 14,392 16,230 13,992 13,759 16,906 
Monroe 2,407 2,361 2,664 2,302 2,533 3,373 
CWC+ Monroe 17,937 16,753 18,894 16.294 16,292 18,210 
Darwin 11,523 12,653 11,280 12,641 12,830 13,602 
No Location 27 40 36 27 1 4 
Grand Total 29487 29,446 30,210 28,962 29,123 31,816 
 
 
 
 47
 Table 4. Freshmen Baccalaureate Offers Fall Semester 1990 – 1995 
Campus 
Total 
Offers 
1990 
Total 
Offers 
1991 
Total 
Offers  
1992 
Total 
Offers  
1993 
Total 
Offers  
1994 
Total 
Offers  
1995 
Alexander 2,650 2,526 2,925 2,533 
No 
Records 2,968 
Allentown 426 461 414 399 Available 425 
Brunswick 1,061 924 1,362 1,163  1,428 
Bennett 846 651 877 641  713 
Dunmore 976 994 93 780  1,051 
Doyletown 324 342 303 261  225 
Flagler 233 244 261 211  262 
Hamilton 1,430 1,181 1256 1.168  1,468 
Mount Royal 717 549 826 538  550 
Mechanicsville 714 544 742 464  525 
North  413 388 444 391  363 
Orrville 1,780 1,908 1,914 1,636  1,914 
Schuyllkill 538 499 554 348  412 
Scarborough 
Valley 159 205 165 163  138 
Wyoming 464 439 489 517  415 
Wadsworth  589 495 488 453  471 
York 636 621 624 571  542 
CWC Total 13,956 12,971 14,537 12,237  13,870 
Monroe 2,113 2,060 2,447 2,049  2,870 
CWC+Monroe 16,069 15,031 16984 14,286  16,740 
Darwin 9,200 10,377 9,806 10,382  11,306 
No Location        
Grand Total 25,269 25,408 26,190 24,668  28,046 
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Table 5. Freshmen Baccalaureate Paid Accepts Fall Semester 1990 – 1995 
Campus 
Total 
Pdacc  
1990 
Total 
Pdacc  
1991 
Total 
Pdacc  
1992 
Total 
Pdacc  
1993 
Total 
Pdacc  
1994 
Total 
Pdacc  
1995 
Alexander 921 938 1063 1024 899 1157 
Allentown 175 176 153 160 171 184 
Brunswick 425 361 600 558 568 627 
Bennett 297 287 312 292 311 349 
Dunmore 391 402 393 319 306 485 
Doyletown 197 213 183 164 108 137 
Flagler 134 156 178 131 101 163 
Hamilton 548 486 488 520 469 584 
Mount Royal 337 283 284 299 237 285 
Mechanicsville 281 209 270 259 218 291 
North  222 185 222 216 160 190 
Orrville 701 741 824 673 548 873 
Schuyllkill 252 224 177 186 165 206 
Scarborough 
Valley 97 119 105 105 64 89 
Wyoming 229 170 226 239 191 204 
Wadsworth  280 217 244 235 187 247 
York 322 269 309 297 254 275 
CWC Total 5,809 5,436 6,031 5,677 4,957 6,346 
Monroe 505 514 593 574 598 699 
CWC+Monroe 6,314 5950 6,031 6,251 5,555 7,045 
Darwin 3,416 3,629 3,481 3,575 3,780 4,360 
No Location        
Grand Total 9,730 9,579 10,105 9,826 9,335 11,405 
Source: Undergraduate Admissions Office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 49
Table 6 illustrates the enrollments at CES campuses for the academic years from 1990-91 to 
1994-95.   
 
 
 
Table 6.  Final Distribution of Enrollment Fall Semester 1994  
(Office of the University Registrar) 
CES 
Campuses 
Fall 
1990 
Fall 
1991 
Fall 
1992 
Fall 
1993 
Fall 
1994 
Four 
Year 
Number
Change 
Percent 
1993 to 
1994 
Number 
Change 
Percent 
Allentown  697 714 607 480 811 -86 -12.3% 131 27.3% 
Alexander 2,509 2,446 2,502 2,470 2,468 -41 -1.6% -2 -0.1% 
Bennett 1,030 936 933 765 839 -191 -18.5% 74 9.7% 
Brunswick 1,665 1,702 1,773 1,726 1,723 58 3.5% -3 -0.2% 
Dunmore      1,811 1,670 1,565 1,389 1,416 -395 -21.8% 27 1.9% 
Doyletown 1,045 940 1,047 981 973 -72 -6.9% 0.8 -0.8% 
Flagler 945 916 991 872 903 -42 -4.4% 31 3.6% 
Hamilton 1,308 1,257 1,248 1,220 1,211 -97 7.4% -9 -0.7% 
Mechanicsville 1,343 1,106 1,015 939 837 -506 -37.7% -102 -10.9% 
Mount Royal 900 938 910 990 1,111 211 23.4% 121 12:2% 
North   1,144 1,095 1,088 1,126 1,040 -104 -9.1% -86 .7.6% 
Orrville 3,207 3,381 3,455 3,088 2,958 -249 -7.8% -130 -4.2% 
Scottsville 1,139 1,085 1,140 1,110 1,018 -121 -10.6% -92 -8.3% 
Scarborough 1,192 1,086 1,118 1,099 1,103 -89 -7.5% 4 0.4% 
Wyoming 990 856 893 888 769 -221 -22.3% -119 -13.4% 
Wadsworth  1,364 1,257 1,270 1,299 1,268 -96 7.0% -31 -2.4% 
York 1,920 2,029 2,052 1,913 1,868 -52 -2.7% -45 -2.4% 
Commonwealth 
Campuses 24,209 23,414 23,607 22,355 22,116 -2,093 -8.6% -239 -1.1% 
3.9.2 Demographics 
Since World War II, the state of Northern population growth was very small compared to other 
states and regions.  For some regions of Northern there was a steady decline in the population.  
The Plainfield metropolitan region was the most hard hit in population loss.  This out-migration 
accelerated in the late 1970’s and continued into the early 1990’s (Arnold, 1993).  In the 1990’s, 
the population of the United States grew by 9.8%.  The Northern population grew by 0.1%.  
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Population change in Western Northern was very different.  The Plainfield metropolitan region 
lost 7.31%.  Other areas of Western Northern state experienced similar population losses 
(Holsworth, 1995).  
The college age sub-groups significantly changed from 1980 to 1990.  The Plainfield area 
saw the age group 17 years old or younger sub-population decline by 17.8%.  The age group 18 
to 24 years-old declined 28.2%.  The age-group of 25 to 29 year-olds decreased by 13.8%.  The 
exodus of younger demographic groups left a population that included 30-44 year-olds, 17.3 % 
of which worked in the service area occupations (Arnold, 1993). 
In a summer of 1990 memo, the director of the division of marketing and recruitment in 
the undergraduate admissions office reported to the campus admissions officers that there would 
be a decline in applications and enrollments for fall of 1990 for the Commonwealth Education 
System (McCoy, personal communication, August 2, 1990).  Although an unpleasant fact, he 
stated that it was not totally surprising given the high school graduation rates in the 
Commonwealth.  In fact, he perceived the Darwin University admissions staff had increased 
market share in a dwindling market cohort, and despite that fact the decreases at some campuses 
were dramatic.   Table 7 lists the projected enrollments by campus and college from 1990 to 1995.   
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Table 7. Projections of Enrollment by Campus and College 1990-1995  
(Office of Budget and Resource Analysis, 1990) 
Campus or College 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Darwin – Associate Degrees 144 128 122 120 119 122 
Commonwealth Campuses 3,272 2,953 2,863 2,859 2,858 2,922 
Monroe 250 214 202 198 197 200 
Olympia 18 18 17 15 15 16 
ASSOCIATE TOTAL 3,684 3,313 3,202 3,193 3,189 3,259 
Darwin: Agriculture 1,400 1,401 1,386 1,386 1,404 1,441 
Arts & Arch 1,309 1,353 1,384 1,407 1,437 1,477 
Business Admin 4,921 4,675 4,455 4,358 4,337 4,330 
Earth Sciences 730 710 699 700 700 707 
Education 2,416 2,487 2,487 2,491 2,521 2,584 
Engineering 5,075 5,043 4,940 4,932 4,943 4,971 
Health Professions 3,163 3,005 2,826 2,727 2,684 2,669 
Liberal Arts 5,435 5,338 5,179 5,076 5,023 5,005 
Communications 1,500 1,339 1,255 1,208 1,180 1,158 
Science 2,490 2,439 2,373 2,315 2,272 2,244 
Undergrad Studies 1,901 1,746 1,723 1,725 1,734 1,747 
Monroe 4 1 1 0 0 0 
Capital 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Intercollege 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Subtotal Baccalaureate 30,345 29,536 28,708 28,326 28,235 28,333 
Commonwealth Campuses 11,395 10,908 10,879 11,023 11,192 11,626 
Monroe 2,042 1,835 1,693 1,621 1,592 1,589 
Olympia 1,589 1,613 1,747 1,822 1,861 1,906 
       
BACCALAUREATE 45,371 43,892 43,026 42,792 42,879 43,453 
UNDERGRADUATE 49,055 47,205 46,228 45,985 46,069 46,713 
 
 
One neighboring state was the largest feeder of out of state students for Darwin University 
than any other state in the nation (Arnold, 1993).  Until 1993, this state allowed students to take 
their state financial aid grants to any state in the country.  For many years, it had the greatest out-
migration of students to other states to pursue higher education than any other state in the country 
(Chronicle of Higher Education, June 2, 1988).  In 1990, a new administration stopped the exodus.  
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Students receiving financial aid from the state agency could no longer take their aid to any state that 
they chose.  The loss of these students had a very direct effect on the enrollment of Darwin 
University CES campuses with residence halls.   
In 1994, Darwin University lowered out of state tuition for CES campuses.  The table below 
illustrates the increase in out of state enrollments beginning in the fall of 1994.   
 
Table 8. Out of State Freshmen Enrolled at Darwin University 1990-1995 
(Undergraduate Admissions Office) 
 
Fall 
1990     
Fall 
1991     
Fall 
1992     
 Total OOS % OOS Total OOS % OOS Total OOS % OOS 
Darwin 4333 1172 27% 4559 1273 28% 4263 1171 27% 
CES 4929 442 9% 4612 371 8% 4775 323 7% 
Monroe 527 74 14% 518 74 14% 581 64 11% 
TOTAL 9789 1688 17% 9689 1718 16% 9619 1558 16% 
          
 
Fall 
1993     
Fall 
1994     
Fall 
1995     
Location Total OOS % OOS Total OOS % OOS Total OOS % OOS 
Darwin 4336 1158 27% 4692 1221 26% 5424 1451 27% 
CES 4528 289 6% 4629 392 8% 6038 510 8% 
Monroe 544 70 13% 595 89 15% 722 74 10% 
TOTAL 9408 1517 16% 9916 1702 17% 12184 2035 17% 
                   
 
3.9.3 Service Area High Schools 
During this period, many of the service area high schools experienced significant declines in 
their enrollments.  Most would never recover to 1988 levels over the next six to eight years 
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(Holsworth 1989, 1995).  All colleges and universities that depend on a regional population for 
applications and enrollments have what are called feeder high schools that consistently send 
students in large numbers to the institution.  Declines in the size of the senior class of feeder high 
schools greatly hindered recruitment efforts.  Table 9 lists the total number of high school 
graduates by each campus service area from 1991 to 1994.   
 
Table 9. Northern High School Graduates by Service Area 1991-1994 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Alexander 5,254 5,357 5,173 5,119 
Allentown 6,473 6,283 6,369 6,372 
Brunswick 5,071 4,850 4,791 4,708 
Monroe 6,645 6,649 6,596 6,218 
Bennett 6,415 6,294 6,403 6,186 
Dunmore 13,605 13,322 13,392 13,197 
Doyletown 3,797 3,668 3,399 3,439 
Flagler 4,417 4,315 4,096 4,023 
Hamilton 4,084 4,069 4,164 4,067 
Mount Royal 2,478 2,397 2,510 2,384 
Mechanicsville 9,550 9,073 9,085 8,717 
North 6,872 6,797 6,711 6,648 
Orrville 20,086 20,151 20,166 20,256 
Scottsville 1,629 1,539 1,620 1,591 
Scarborough Valley 2,811 2,695 2,694 2,675 
Darwin 5,168 5,074 4,882 4,711 
Wyoming 3,344 3,414 3,516 3,298 
Scarborough 4,051 4,183 4,204 4,127 
York 11,337 11,192 11,104 10,904 
Total 123,087 121,322 120,875 118,640 
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3.9.4 College Going Rates 
Another important statistic for admission analysts at Darwin University was the post-secondary 
education rate or college going rate.  This statistic indicates the number of high school seniors 
who enroll in higher education after high school.  Northern had always ranked low among all of 
the northern industrial states.  In 1989, the Northern college-going rate was 60.8%.  The rate was 
69.7 in 1998.  The table below was produced annually by the Office of Budget and Resources 
Analysis illustrating the college going rates by service areas.  
In a memo to CES admissions officers, (M. Rubinstein, personal communication, 
September 25, 1991) summarized the just completed recruitment year for each campus.  The 
highlights included prominent mention of the decline of the high school graduation cohort in the 
state, increase in college-going rate of state high school seniors, these new college goers were 
from lower achieving academic and lower socio-economic strata.  These lower achieving 
students may have found the community college as a more attractive choice to begin college for 
both academic and financial reasons.  The summary for each campus indicated the seriousness of 
the enrollment situation.  Table 10 is a summary of the college-going rates in the Darwin CES 
service areas. 
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Table 10. Essential particles Northern High School Graduates and Portions to College  
by Darwin Service Area Ranked by Percent to College 1994  
(University Budget Office, 1995) 
 
Service Areas Equaling or Exceeding State Average 
High School Graduates  Graduates to College 
Service Area Number % of Total  Number % of 
Total 
% to 
College 
Mechanicsville 8,717 7.3%  6,844 8.3% 78.5% 
Bennett 6,186 5.2%  4,777 5.8% 77.2% 
Dunmore   13,197 11.1%  10,019 12.2% 75.9% 
Orrville 20,256 17.1%  15,134 18.4% 74.7% 
North  6,648 5.6%  4,916 6.0% 73.9% 
Allentown 6,372 5.4%  4,687 5.7% 73.6% 
Wadsworth  4,127 3.5%  2,937 3.6% 71.2% 
Wyoming 3,298 2.8%  2,303 2.8% 69.8% 
Subtotal 68,801 58.0%  51,617 62.9% 75.0% 
 
Service Areas Below State Average 
High School Graduates  Graduates to College 
Service Area Number % of Total  Number % of 
Total 
% to 
College 
Monroe 4,708 4.0%  3,003 3.7% 63.8% 
York 10,904 9.2%  6,944 8.5% 63.7% 
Hamilton 4,067 3.4%  2,572 3.1% 63.2% 
Scarborough 2,675 2.3%  1,691 2.1% 63.2% 
Scottsville 1,591 1.3%  992 1.2% 62.4% 
Brunswick 6,218 5.2%  3,875 4.7% 62.3% 
Darwin 4,711 4.0%  2,813 3.4% 59.7% 
Alexander 5,119 4.3%  3,001 3.7% 58.6% 
Doyletown 3,439 2.9%  1,967 2.4% 57.2% 
Flagler 4,023 3.4%  2,275 2.8% 56.5% 
Mount Royal 2,384 2.0%  1,287 1.6% 54.0% 
Subtotal 49,839 42.0%  30,420 37.1% 61.0% 
State Total 118,640 100.0%  82,037 100.0% 69.1% 
 
Beginning in early 1990’s there was a dramatic and steady increase in the number of high 
school graduates from the Commonwealth entering college (M. Rubinstein, personal 
communication, September 21, 1991).   
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3.9.5 Market Forces- Economics 
Darwin University CES needed to be program and market competitive.  It could do neither 
effectively.   In the early 1990’s, Darwin University was confronted by two powerful market 
forces: declining demographics and an economic recession. These conditions left Darwin and 
CES with limited resources. 
A growing number of families were dependent on financial aid from federal, state and 
institutional sources.  Darwin University CES competed with other less expensive community 
colleges, public universities in the State System of Higher Education and the local private 
institutions.  Public higher education had traditionally fared well in the recruitment of traditional-
age students in great part because of affordability.  Many private colleges and universities were 
relatively successful by offering creative financial aid packages and scholarships to compete with 
the public sector (M. Rubinstein, personal communication, October 19, 1993).  The proportion of 
financial aid that could cover tuition and other education-related fees began to decline in the late 
1980’s and continued into the mid 1990’s (College Board, 2000).  Darwin University had very 
little institutional aid available, forcing many middle-income students to borrow.  The cost of public 
higher education in Northern was among the highest in the country (Murphy, 1991).   
The amount of grant aid was slowly supplanted by loan aid during this period.  The 
declining funding of government aid made less expensive public institutions and private 
institutions able to discount more attractive alternatives to the CES campuses of Darwin 
University.  Table 11 was created by the Northern Department of Education and illustrates the 
tuition and fees of private and public institutions from fall 1990 to fall 1995.  Table 12 was 
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created by the Darwin Office of Budget with in-state and out-of-state tuition fees from 1991-92 
to 1995-96. 
 
Table 11. Undergraduate In-State Tuition and Required Fees by Institutional Category  
1990-91 through 1995-96 (Northern State Department of Education, 2000) 
 
 1990- 91 1991- 92 1992- 93 1993- 94 1994- 95 1995- 96 
State Universities $2,569 $3,028 $3,236 $3,571 $3,755 $3,945 
State-Related 
Commonwealth 
Universities 
3,807 4,134 4,483 4,594 4,853 5,091 
Community 
Colleges 
1,398 1,478 1,578 1,626 1,685 1,797 
Private State- Aided 
Institutions 
10,021 11,000 11,905 12,835 13,522 14,194 
Private Colleges 
and Universities 
9,357 10,167 10,811 11,572 12,264 12,937 
Private Two-Year 
Colleges 
6,229 6,733 7,284 7,915 8,348 8,371 
College of 
Technology 
3,250 3,420 3,645 3,845 4,095 4,295 
 
 
Table 12. Darwin University Tuition and Fees by Semester 1991-1995  
(University Budget Office, 2006) 
Fall 
Semester 
In State Residents - 
Full-Time 
Darwin 
In State 
Residents-CES 
Campuses 
Non-
Northern 
Residents - 
Darwin 
Non-Northern 
Residents - 
CES Campuses 
1991-92 $2,401 $2,329 $4,794 $4,794 
1992-93 2,509 2,437 5,022 5,022 
1993-94 2,611 2,536 5,285 5,285 
1994-95 2,718 2,639 5,562 3,935 
1995-96 2,829 2,747 5,855 4,139 
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A second response to market conditions is product development or new academic programs.  
During this period, only three campuses were allowed to offer baccalaureate degrees in the Darwin 
University system.  There were attempts to offer new associate degree programs but this had limited 
success and some had actually failed (M. E. Bayuk, personal communication, August, 1995).  
Darwin University did not do market analysis to learn the market needs for an academic program (J. 
Wayne, personal communication, June 16, 2006,  B. Snyder, Personal communication  June 7, 
2006).   
The decrease in the pool of high school graduates created a more competitive situation for 
colleges and universities throughout Northern.  The associate director of market planning and 
research for Darwin University’s undergraduate admissions office, reported that the smaller pool 
resulted in increased “intrusions” by more selective private institutions into what had traditionally 
been regarded as a market for the public sector colleges and universities (Arnold, 1993).  These 
“intrusions” created new options for Northern high school seniors.  Both Darwin University internal 
admission reports and reports from the Northern State Department of Education indicated that 
private institutions of higher education were able to sustain and even increase enrollments during 
the recession years of 1991 to 1995 (Khanna, McCormick and Polliard, 2000).  Table 13 illustrates 
the fluctuation in Northern undergraduate enrollments at private, public and community colleges 
during the period of fall 1990 through 1996.   
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Table 13. Fall Enrollments by Institutional Category and Level 1990 through 1996  
(Northern Department of Education) 
 
Total 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Undergraduate 566,027 579,553 587,977 580,693 571,887 571,355 568,222 
State 
Universities 99,082 99,850 98,624 95,962 94,660 94,370 93,711 
Undergraduate 87,839 88,398 87,460 85,019 83,586 83,210 82,839 
State- related 
Research 
Universities 140,928 141,938 141,524 138,656 137,045 139,362 138,855 
Undergraduate 110,885 111,191 110,225 107,101 105,763 108,142 108,437 
Community 
Colleges         
Undergraduate 104,292 112,518 119,730 118,885 114,425 111,353 109,164 
Private State- 
Aided 
Institutions 46,437 47,591 47,818 41,811 41,659 40,542 40,702 
Undergraduate 27,500 27,758 27,535 22,257 21,479 21,313 21,682 
Private Colleges 
And 
Universities 165,665 167,713 172,086 177,194 176,190 177,092 176,669 
Undergraduate 138,513 138,746 141,224 144,763 143,163 143,655 143,012 
PRIVATE 
TWO- YEAR 
COLLEGES        
Undergraduate 6,233 6,433 4,583 4,660 4,356 5,092 5,590 
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Other factors contributed to enrollment declines at Darwin University and other colleges 
and universities: 
 
1. Surplus capacity – Northern had more seats for undergraduate students than there 
were students available.  
2. Changing buyer needs- Darwin University campuses were heavily dependent on 
students choosing associate degree programs for enrollment.  Associate degree 
programs were very popular for adult students.  This began to change in the late 
1980s. These majors became obsolete. 
3. Trade Re-adjustment Act- The federal government made educational financial aid 
available for workers who were forced from their jobs because of foreign trade 
competition.  The funds were intended to finance post-secondary education for 
programs that could be completed in two calendar years.  Funding began in the early 
1980s and continued into the 1990s.  However, by the early 1990s, the number of 
adult students had significantly decreased to a small handful each semester. 
4. More residence halls were built at campuses at Alexander, Monroe and Brunswick. 
These on-campus housing increases negatively impacted on other CES campuses. 
3.9.6 Darwin University Responds 
Darwin University was not well equipped to easily turn resources toward the problems of 
enrollment deficits.  Solutions encompassed institutional management, possible restructuring, 
resource development and reallocation, strategic planning and most of all a financial 
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commitment. All of these prescriptions either implicitly or explicitly called for an expansion of 
university resources for marketing and recruitment. Options and resources were weak, as 
decision makers worked to orchestrate various initiatives to confront the enrollment crisis. 
The response to the enrollment crisis may have been slow at some campuses as well as 
the central administration at the undergraduate admissions office and Commonwealth Education 
System.  The hope and thought was that the application decline was a one-year glitch and a 
recovery was imminent.  However, the recovery did not come the next year as expected.  The 
declines in applications continued, and enrollments declined as a result of the decline in 
freshmen applications.  As the enrollment crisis deepened and widened throughout the Darwin 
University campus system, administrators and enrollment planners responded in a variety of 
ways.     
3.9.7 Recruitment Initiatives 
There were discussions at different times and at different levels of the University about the 
possible impact of the high school enrollment declines (H. Wallace, personal communication, 
December 12 2006).  As early as October 1989, the vice president of the Commonwealth 
Education System (CES) forwarded a memo to all campus executive officers that summarized an 
analysis of issues that CEOs believed to be strategic concerns for the 1990s.  Three of the 13 
issues were directly related to recruitment of students.  CEOs asked how CES will recruit and 
retain students, development of recruitment strategies for traditional-age, adult and minority 
students.  Another issue identified was the development of new academic programs at CES 
campuses to meet the needs of local business and industry, and location-bound adults.  Although 
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not mentioned in the 13 item Delphi, there was an item at the end of the memo mentioning the 
need to increase public awareness of CES campuses in major Northern markets.  Six CEOs voted 
for students as the number one issue for the CES strategic planning process for 1990.  There was 
no specific mention of traditional age student recruitment as a critical issue or concern.  More 
mention and emphasis were on adults and minority student recruitment.  The CEOs did not 
mention the recruitment of traditional-age students at or near the top of critical issues facing the 
administration of the CES and the campuses in the near future.   
Over the next four years, campus executive officers and the Vice President of CES had 
variety of meetings to discuss enrollment declines.  These meetings were meant to develop 
tactics to address the enrollment shortfalls.  At each meeting, CEOs discussed the enrollment 
declines in CES and made a number of recommendations.    
The outcomes of these meetings generated recommendations and included a variety of 
initiatives.  There were increases in advertising.  Some campuses hired advertising agencies.  
Campus decision makers complained that the office of university relations was inattentive and 
slow to react to CES campus needs.   The CES deans and staff were able to bring a force to bear 
on university relations activities that would be more responsive in both speed and project 
management of advertising and promotion for CES.   
Campus admissions offices formed geographic consortia.  Campuses met to discuss the 
enrollment crisis and possible initiatives and make recommendations to Darwin decision makers.  
The consortium identified three areas of critical concern for recruitment at Darwin University: 
traditional age students, minority students and adult students.   
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The admissions officers and the directors of student affairs from the southwest Darwin 
University campuses drafted a joint memo addressed to the vice president of the Commonwealth 
Education System and the director of undergraduate admissions stating the need for dramatic 
action to remedy the application and enrollment declines (R. Boston, personal communication, 
June 30, 1993).  The authors reported continuing application and enrollment declines university-
wide and at the southwest campuses.  It emphasized the critical need to understand the issues 
involved and to make additional resources available to increase and enhance current marketing 
and recruitment efforts.  The memo made eight recommendations to improve marketing and 
recruitment efforts.  In addition, it included recommendations that were short term and long term 
and the specific resources needed.  The number one listed long-term recommendation from the 
southwest group was the need for a regional comprehensive marketing plan.   
Out of state tuition was reduced at CES campuses.  One attempt to lure out of state 
students to the Commonwealth campuses was a reduction of the out of state tuition from 200% 
of in state tuition to 150% of in state tuition.   
More admissions staff were hired.  The CES Vice President urged campuses to add more 
staff and hire directors of enrollment management.  A number of campuses created a position 
and hired a director of enrollment management.   
New admissions positions were created at the undergraduate admissions office at Darwin.  
In 1993, a director of admissions for the Commonwealth Education System was hired.  The CES 
Vice President Wayne searched for and hired a director of admissions for the CES.  The mission 
of this director was to bring greater attention to CES campus issues and to coordinate the 
recruitment efforts at the CES campuses.  Upper level decision makers believed that this 
individual could better serve the needs of the CES campuses.   
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 This director was housed in the undergraduate admissions office.  The thinking was that 
CES lacked a presence and influence in the decisions of the undergraduate admissions office and 
university relations.  Curiously, the CES admissions director had no undergraduate admissions 
experience nor had ever worked with traditional-age student recruitment.  Her professional 
background was in adult and continuing education.  These limitations proved to be an 
impediment to timely action and decisions.  However, it must be said that the CES admissions 
director was a very fast learner and became a very knowledgeable admissions practitioner.   
Also in 1993, a marketing director was appointed.  The director of marketing was 
expected to direct all marketing efforts for the campuses as well as Darwin.  Although, the 
marketing director was housed in the undergraduate admissions office, there was no separate 
budget or dedicated staff made available to the marketing director.   
Regular meetings and workshops were scheduled.   In June of 1993, the recently 
appointed director of CES admissions convened a workshop at Darwin (R. Jefferson, personal 
communication, June 18, 1993). The outcome of the meeting was a statement of future plans and 
recruitment initiatives to be shared with relevant enrollment decision makers.  Participants were 
asked to evaluate the workshop and share comments about the current CES application and 
enrollment situations.  A number of comments were critical of the CES leadership and the lack 
of system-wide resources available for recruitment. 
In 1994 and 1995, the CES vice president requested that campuses begin an admissions 
self-study (T. Pierce, personal communication, November, 9, 1995).  The self study involved 
CEOs, CEPOs and admissions officers at campuses near New Town and Plainfield.  The charge 
from the CES vice president was to examine and improve the recruitment process and enroll 
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more qualified students at the CES campuses.  One outside consultant had recently completed 
reviews or made assessments for these same campuses.  The Gallup Organization (1995) 
conducted surveys for Bennett and Plainfield and was studying Scarborough Valley.  There was 
criticism of the Gallup study results (R. Boston, personal communication, August 8, 2006).  A 
Plainfield area advertising agency was contracted to develop advertising and communication 
plans as well as marketing assessments for Bennett, Mechanicsville and North campuses.  The 
task force report made a number of recommendations and points for further discussion.  One 
important point addressed inconsistent funding for more regionalized marketing efforts. 
In December of 1993, campuses were directed to establish a marketing team as part of the 
strategic planning process (J. Wayne, personal communication, December, 16, 1993).  They were 
then expected to develop a marketing and recruitment plan that would grow out of the campus 
marketing teams.  The marketing and recruitment plans would be an integrated effort of the 
admissions, continuing education and university relations offices. The goals of the teams and the 
integrated marketing plans were as follows: development of planning and integration teams to 
support campus strategic and enrollment plans, maximize campus marketing efforts, raise staff 
and faculty awareness of new approaches to marketing, create a network for sharing ideas among 
campuses, develop collaborative marketing approaches within regions and across the University 
and CES.  CES leadership emphasized that strategic marketing was a key component of the 
strategic planning process. 
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3.9.8 Problems and Shortcomings 
Little marketing research and analysis were ever done on a consistent and regular basis (B. 
Snyder, personal communication, June 6, 2006 and H. Wallace, personal communication, 
December 12, 2006).  There was an analysis of the service areas and counties each year in the 
Newton and Holsworth reports out of the office of budget and analysis.  However, there was 
minimal investment in recruitment technology (B. Cooper, personal communication, November 
9, 2006).  Darwin University remained wedded to main frame and other campus home-grown 
technologies. 
Financial aid data were never considered or evaluated as an intrinsic part of the 
recruitment to enrollment process (R. Owens, personal communication, August 10, 2006).  Aid 
was awarded on need eligibility and a fist come-first served basis.  Many CES campuses had a 
history of late application activity in their service area.  The award cycle at Darwin University 
disproportionately favored Darwin flagship campus applicants and disadvantaged CES campus 
applicants.   
Associate degree applications began a precipitous decline starting in the late 1980s. This 
decline was never altered.  One early memo (R. Owens, personal communication, April 29, 
1989) made prominent mention of the dilemma of associate degree applications.  In February, 
Dr. Gene Greskovich, Assistant VP and Director of the Division of Technology, CES was asked 
to address the University Council Enrollment Planning and Policies (S. L. Walker, personal 
communication, February 22, 1989) and stated there was a need to increase recruitment for the 
engineering technology programs.  The concluding statement of the UCEPP meeting was a 
suggestion that CES campuses increase academic quality and quantity.   
 67
Unfortunately, there was a perception that blame was placed on people rather than an 
analysis of the overall campus situation (R. Jefferson, personal communication, December 3, 
1993).  Darwin University decision makers did not fully grasp or understand the market place 
and interplay of demographics, economics, and various other factors and the implications for 
Darwin University recruitment and enrollment management. 
3.9.9 Data and Information 
There were attempts within the enrollment management structure of CES to develop data and 
information management systems to better serve decision makers needs (R. Owens, personal 
communication, April 28, 1991).  One such attempt was by the Undergraduate Admissions 
Office to develop a report that incorporated facets of a couple of different admission reports into 
one more detailed report accessible to all admissions officers and decision makers.   
CES wanted each campus admissions officer and enrollment planning officer to develop 
a “home-grown” data report function that would generate data reports that would have a forecast 
ability and meet specific campus needs.  CES decision makers wanted campuses to look at 
enrollments in smaller detail with an eye toward pinpointing shortfalls (J. Beatty, personal 
communication, September 18, 1994).   
A report generator capability was developed from the Darwin University Administrative 
Information Services office.  The report generator was known as administrative information 
decision aid for admissions (AIDAA).  Users could customize reports and save the report 
parameters for repetition as needed by a user.  Interview respondents reported difficulties.  One 
difficulty was getting these reports into the hands of enrollment planners and decision makers.  
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The second difficulty was having the decision makers understand the various reports.  Many of 
these reports seemed to lack insight to an untrained analyst.  Even admissions officers did not 
make full use of the AIDAA report generator.  These data modules were specifically developed 
for admissions officers.  AIDAA was expected to be an indispensable data tool for admissions 
officers and enrollment planning officers.  AIDAA would generate weekly or ad hoc reports as 
needed to clarify the admission application and enrollment picture for decision makers and 
planners.   
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4.0  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 SURVEY AND INTERVIEW SAMPLES 
Potential participants were identified based on the roster of campus and university staff and 
administration. This annual directory was published each fall listing undergraduate admissions 
officers, directors of student affairs, and campus executive officers at Commonwealth Education 
System campuses, members of both the upper administration of the Commonwealth Education 
System and those of the undergraduate admissions office at Darwin.  This was a convenience 
sample based on the years from 1990-91 to 1995-96.  
In responding to some of these limitations, this study relied upon the high degree of 
stability in these respective offices where many participants are still employed at Darwin 
University.  These offices and members include: campus admissions officers, campus executive 
officers, campus directors of student affairs, Commonwealth Education System administrators 
and Undergraduate Admissions Office administrators at the flagship campus. 
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4.2 PROCEDURES 
Recruitment - The investigator e-mailed or telephoned potential informants inviting 
participation.  A summary of the dissertation proposal was mailed or e-mailed to these 
prospective participants.  All participants were asked to read and sign a consent form developed 
by the Darwin University Office for Research Protections and the University of Pittsburgh 
Research Conduct and Compliance Office. 
A coded survey for identification was sent to members of the Darwin University 
undergraduate admissions office staff and campus and central administrators having admissions 
and enrollment management responsibilities at Darwin University from 1990-91 to 1995-96.  
Those who consented to participate were given the choice of a paper or electronic version of the 
survey.  Non-respondents were contacted after a 30 day hiatus with a communication seeking 
their participation.   
After the survey data were tabulated, those who completed the survey were asked to 
participate in an audio tape recorded interview, recorded face to face or by telephone.  A session 
lasted from 60 minutes to two hours.   
4.3 SURVEY DESIGN AND OBJECTIVES 
The case study approach has long been an important method for investigating organizational 
behavior.  Grounded in the study of history, it has considerably enriched our understanding of 
American foreign policy and business decision making in the last 30 years (George and 
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McKeown, 1985).  However, it is not and cannot be merely good story telling.  The development 
and use of a survey instrument has added an element of quantification to the anecdotal 
observations and testimony.  Also, an interview questionnaire has helped to obtain information 
from participants. 
The use of a survey instrument and an interview questionnaire measures observations 
both quantitatively and qualitatively and make causal inferences possible (George and 
McKeown, 1985).   
In this study, these two instruments were designed to collect historical information 
directly from participants about their knowledge, recollections and perceptions of the events that 
occurred in the organizations’ recent past.  The instrument surveyed admissions officers, campus 
enrollment officers, campus executive officers in the Commonwealth Education System, and 
administrators and enrollment planners at Darwin.  Their responses addressed their perceptions 
concerning information management and the decision making processes occurring at their 
campuses and administrative units in the period 1990-91 to 1995-96.  
The purpose of a survey in this study was to produce an historical description that was 
quantifiable.  This survey allowed the researcher to quantify the various administrators and 
decision makers responses highlighting their knowledge and perceptions about a series of events 
occurring between 1990-91 and 1995-96.  The survey questionnaire was designed based on the 
case study approach formulated by Chun Wei Choo (1998).  Choo’s design is divided into topic 
segments for a case study.  It addressed the following topics in information management and 
organizational theory: (1) problem recognition, (2) communications, (3) information seeking and 
(4) decision making.   
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4.3.1 Problem Recognition 
The first section of the survey focused on key campus decision makers perceptions relative to the 
gravity of the campus enrollment problems.  Responses to the eight survey questions in this 
section helped determine the availability and amount of information available to decision 
makers, and the value of that information.   
4.3.2 Communications 
Researchers (Wilensky, 1967; Choo, 1998; Wang and Ahmed, 2003) indicate that 
communications in organizations reflect the statuses and aspirations of its members.   Often 
communication in organizations is bottom up; that is, members of organizational hierarchies tend 
to talk upward and listen upward.  At times though, these members tend to shape their upward 
messages to enhance good news and suppress bad.  Status and risk have implications that shape 
information seeking.    
Choo (1998) has stated that issues of quantity and quality in communications have 
implications for decision making.  The second section sought to illustrate better the 
communications process by determining if communications were open and constructive.  That is 
to say was there a constant flow and exchange of information that fostered meaningful discussion 
between the various staff levels of participation in the decision making process?   
One aspect of Bounded Rationality theory is that affective factors can play a pivotal role 
in information seeking and decision making (Simon, 1997).  In some decision making 
environments, individual personalities can overwhelm information and the communication 
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process.  Individuals have their own preferences, values and aspirations that will influence 
communication and information seeking.  The survey respondents in this case study evaluated 
the communication process from the top of the organizational hierarchy to bottom.   
In the light of Choo’s interpretation of the decision making process, survey questions in 
this section will address research questions pertaining to the communication process. Was the 
communication process cooperative and constructive or was communication inhibited and 
stymied the exchange of critical information from essential participants, and the primacy of 
individual personalities over information in the decision making process?  Were decisions the 
outcomes of actions committed by autonomous actors or were they the actions of team members 
comprising an organizational culture?  In the case of the university system, were decisions made 
based on the goals of the organization or were certain individuals able to influence the decision 
making process in ways that excluded pertinent information and observations from line staff? 
The participation of line staff could yield essential information to the enrollment problem and 
possible solutions.  According to Wang and Ahmed (2003), another aspect or outcome of the 
influence of personalities could be the loss of trust among participants to be candid and ensure 
that frank communication and consequent insights would benefit the organization. 
4.3.3 Information Search 
The third section addresses the search for information that might have influenced administrators 
and enrollment planners in their decision making.  The questions asked for responses that pertain 
to the quantity of the information available to the decision makers and their access to this 
information.  Survey questions in this section sought to determine the extent to which decision 
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makers may have been overwhelmed by information and the complexities of the decision making 
processes in large organizations such as a multi-campus university system.  The quality of 
information is important.  It is useful therefore to discern what information was perceived 
valuable and how it influenced the decision making process.  Was decision making typified more 
by clarity and consistency or by ambiguity and inconsistency?  Did decision makers have a clear 
idea of the crisis, its gravity, and of the information for decision making?  Did they have a time 
frame for a discussion of the information and the decision options?  The survey questions in this 
section considered the extent to which decision makers may have misread or misunderstood the 
information needed for their decision making. 
4.3.4 Decision Making 
Finally, the fourth section addressed the actual decision making process.  Respondents were 
asked to answer a series of questions rating their own participation in the decision making 
process and then to evaluate the overall process.  Survey questions in this section sought to 
determine how the decision making proceeded. The survey questions being asked in this section 
determine whether this was a classic illustration of the anarchic or garbage can decision making 
model common in a university environment.  In the garbage can decision model, the organization 
operates on the basis of inconsistent and ill-defined decision making processes (Cohen, March 
and Olsen, 1972).  The decision making process lacks a coherent or formal structure.  Relevant 
participants are often not aligned or closely coupled to understand fully their role and the goals 
of the organization.  One example of this type of loose coupled alignment could be the 
admissions and university relations officers that have little contact with one another.  Moreover, 
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they made no coordinated marketing plan to promote advertising and recruitment.  At times, 
participants may have neither access to pertinent information nor do they discuss alternatives in a 
coordinated time frame.  Participants vary in the amount of time and effort devoted to the 
decision process.  Often participants are unsure of their role and are unsure of the organizational 
goals.  Decision participants often come together in irregular time frames, information sharing is 
inconsistent, and the process is by trial and error.   
4.4 INTERVIEW OBJECTIVES 
The second instrument to be used in this study was an interview with a convenience sample of 
the survey respondents.   In a follow-up to the survey, the investigator requested interviews with 
participants whose roles on their respective campuses, and whose decision making positions 
made their insights especially valuable to the case study.  These prospective interview 
participants were identified by the investigator’s knowledge of the historical data which are at 
the center of this study.  Also, the investigator asked participants to recommend additional 
informants for interviews.  Non-respondents received a second request for an interview 
approximately thirty days after the first request.  Others required three to six months of requests. 
The qualitative data supplemented the quantitative data collected through the interviews.  
Fifteen interview questions were developed.  Questions were open-ended to elicit in-depth 
responses.  These qualitative data validated, framed and illustrated the case study.  Interviews 
were on-site or by telephone at the convenience of informants.   Informants could review the 
script of responses and were allowed, if desired, to respond or modify their original responses. 
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Interviews draw out the assessment of the enrollment situation and the overall quality of 
the decision making process.  Responses identify strengths and limitations and suggest ways of 
improving enrollment management with effective application of information management 
principles in organizational decision making. 
4.5 METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
Responses were based on a Likert scale and one response per question.  Survey participants were 
asked to give a single numerical response with one choice and ten options (1–10) ranging from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (10) in the section.  Using the broad scale of 1 through 10 
allows for finer distinctions for the responses.  Survey responses were analyzed using descriptive 
statistics.  One example would be the availability and quantity of information for decision 
making.  A survey question was developed to ask participants if they believed they had a 
sufficient quantity of information for effective decision making with a scale of one, strongly 
disagree to ten, strongly agree.   
These data were used to collect responses and gain information from the overall 
population to answer the research questions.  The data from the survey were analyzed using 
means and standard deviations to collect information about the total population. The survey 
population was divided into sub-groups of campus admissions officers, campus executive 
officers (CEO), campus enrollment planning officers (CEPO), Commonwealth Education 
System administrators and Darwin admissions personnel.  These sub-groups were compared to 
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each other to see if there are different responses to the survey questions.   The investigator 
presented the findings as they relate to each of the four research questions.   
Data from the completed survey were analyzed using The Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) computer software.  Because the sample size was only 28, it was decided 
that the most appropriate statistical analysis that was needed was a t test of significance on 
selected questions.  It was determined in a comparison of the survey question results, there was a 
statistically significant difference in the mean responses to 8 survey questions that involved the 
campus admissions officers and the campus executive officers.  Also, there was a similar 
difference in mean responses in two survey questions by the campus admissions officers and the 
Darwin decision makers. 
A t-test was used to test the significance of the differences of the means of the two 
groups.  A 2-tailed t-test with independent samples with α = .05 was used to determine 
differences between the perception of the admissions officers and campus executive officers, and 
Darwin decision makers.   Appendix  I shows the results of the t-tests. 
Interview data were grouped by organization memberships as campus admissions 
officers, campus enrollment planning officers, campus executive officers and members of the 
undergraduate admissions office and the CES central administration at the flagship campus of 
Darwin University.    The interview responses were then further grouped into tables by the case 
study topics or categories of problem recognition, communication, information search and 
decision making.  The analysis of the interview data aimed at delineating themes and 
perspectives of the events.  These themes or concepts were then added to the case study 
categories. The interview data were used to add qualitative detail and insights to the survey 
responses.   
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4.6 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents the findings of the study.  The purpose of the chapter is to review the data 
from the survey questions and describe the results by the demographic groups.  Also, the 
interview and written responses of the organization members have been included in the findings 
to add narrative substance to the various survey responses.  The uses of the interviews were to 
inform and add substantive depth to the survey responses.   
In the abstract, we often assume there is a perfect or orderly rationality in decision 
making.  The theoretical framework are Herbert Simon’s theory of Bounded Rationality and the 
anarchic (or garbage can) decision making model created by James March, Michael Cohen and 
Johan Olsen.  How were decisions made?  What were the mechanics of the process?  The focus 
of the study was an assessment of the decision making process and the four components of 
problem recognition, communications, information search and the actual decision making.   
4.7 THE SURVEY RESPONDENT POPULATION DESCRIPTION 
The survey subjects of this study were participants at various levels of the enrollment 
management hierarchy.  The first group was the campus admission officers.  There were 17 
possible participants and eleven did participate and take the survey.  Four of the admissions 
officers were interviewed.  The second population group was the campus enrollment planning 
officers.  Of a potential group of 17, six participated in the survey and three were interviewed.  
The third group was the campus executive officers.  Of the seventeen potential CEOs, six 
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participated in the survey and three were interviewed.  The fourth group of enrollment 
management participants was decision makers at Darwin.  There were five potential participants 
contacted in the undergraduate admissions office.  Two chose to participate in the surveys and 
interviews.  In the Office of the Vice President and Dean of the Commonwealth Education 
System, three participants were invited to participate and all three did participate in the survey 
and interview.  Each interview informant was given an alias and code number of AO # 1 for 
admissions officers, CEPO #2 campus enrollment planning officers, CEO #3 for campus 
executive officers and DM #4 for Darwin decision makers.  Also, interview respondents were 
give pseudonyms to ensure anonymity and confidentiality.  Table 14 lists the survey and 
interview respondents by organization membership. 
 
Table 14. Survey and Interview Respondents 
 Population Survey 
Respondents 
Interview 
Respondents 
Admissions Officers 17 11 3
Campus Enrollment Planning Officer 17 6 3
Campus Executive Officers 17 6 3
Flagship Decision Maker - CES Central 
Administration 
4 3 3
Flagship Decision Maker - UAO 
Administration 
6 2 2
Totals 61 28 14
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4.7.1 Problem Recognition and Defining Problem 
Different campuses were experiencing varying degrees of enrollment fluctuation.  The 
enrollment declines were uneven among the campuses and the causes of the decline were not 
fully understood.  Analysis of the enrollment declines was complicated by the question of 
availability of information to key members of the enrollment management organization.  The 
number of campuses involved and the number of sources of information complicated problem 
recognition.  The multiple problems of campus and information sources as problematic adheres 
to anarchic or garbage can decision model (Daft, 1982).  The many campuses and layers of 
organizational departments and members complicated communication and information sharing.  
Because campus and CES decision makers did not fully comprehend the situation, this 
influenced both diagnosis and the search for solutions. 
Problem recognition and diagnosis that would lead to decisions are constrained by 
organization member’s capabilities and the social structure of the enrollment management 
hierarchy (Cyert and March, 1963).  Based on interview reports, there were both social and 
cognitive limitations to information processing and analysis of the problem.  The training and 
expertise of organization members may have been insufficient to interpret data and information 
to diagnose the problem. 
Admissions officers as a group indicated (4.67) that campus decision makers did not 
quickly recognize and respond to the enrollment declines at the campus level.  Darwin decision 
makers agreed (5.00) with the campus admissions officers.  Campus executive officers gave 
themselves high marks (8.67) on the question of campus response to the problem recognition and 
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the enrollment declines.  This is a significant disparity in how the two groups viewed the 
recognition and response of the campus enrollment declines.   
Campus admissions officers as a group did not believe (3.70) that Darwin decision 
makers quickly recognized and responded to the enrollment declines.  This score is even lower 
than the score given to the campus decision makers on this topic. 
The responses to question 7 indicates (4.64) admissions officers did not believe that 
campus enrollment decision makers understood the available data and information for decision 
making.  Campus executive officers disagreed (9.33) indicating a high level of confidence in 
their understanding of the information for decision making.  Darwin respondents had a similar 
level of confidence (8.50) to appropriately understand the data and information for decision 
making.  Once again, admissions officers did not agree and gave lower (3.90) scores on question 
number 8. 
Interview reports confirmed the admissions officers belief that the campus leadership did 
not fully understand the dimensions of the enrollment declines.  The interview comments are 
certainly supportive data for the interpretation of Bounded Rationality in this case study in the 
area of problem recognition.  A campus enrollment planning officer reported the North campus 
executive officer never seemed concerned about the enrollment situation.  Another example from 
a Darwin decision maker was the comment that campus CEOs may have been out of their 
element.  These are two examples that indicate the degree of limited capabilities to comprehend 
and act in the realm of problem recognition and decision making.  It is very possible that campus 
leaders were distracted by a variety of other problems on campus that seemed more pressing at 
the time.  O’Reilly (1982) has pointed out that problem recognition and decision making 
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performance are often decreased by various distractions caused by time pressures and pursuing 
multiple objectives.   
 
Table 15 
Problem Recognition   
 
Representative Interview Data 
Admissions Officers 
Information and Reports 
• “There was not a lot of discussion or analysis of the demographic projections reports 
at Dunmore in the late 1980s.  The CEO did not believe that the projected declines 
would greatly affect Dunmore.  A new CEO at Dunmore did voice greater concern” 
(AO #6, 2006). 
 
Expertise 
• “My campus administration never saw the enrollment declines coming and we were 
not positioned to react in a market responsive way.  We had no programs to take to 
the market place to benefit the campus” (AO #1, 2006).   
• “Enrollments at Wyoming went flat first and then started a long term decline.  The 
Wyoming CEO was not fully aware and involved with the crisis” (AO #5, 2006). 
• Two admissions officers stated that they were not trained or experienced to be 
marketing knowledgeable admissions recruiters (AO #1 and AO #6, 2006).  
• “I had a masters in counseling and not in marketing” (AO #6, 2006).   
 
Campus Enrollment Planning Offers 
• “No CEO ever seemed to be very concerned about the enrollment situation” (CEPO 
#4, 2006).    
 
Campus Executive Officers 
 
Information and Reports 
• “We had sufficient data and reports pertaining to enrollments.  The difficulty was that 
Darwin undergraduate admissions office had to capture 3,200 new freshmen each 
year and the campuses were a secondary concern.  This was always an internal 
struggle that was never resolved.  The campuses had to work to convert referral offers 
into enrollments each year with very limited resources” (CEO #5, 2005).   
 
Darwin Decision Makers 
 
Information and Reports 
• “The high school demographic reports were widely distributed but were not widely 
discussed or understood” (DM #4, 2006).   
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Problem Recognition   
 
Representative Interview Data 
• “It was also possible and likely that a number of the campus executive officers were 
unaware of the data reports and predicted decline in Northern high school graduates” 
(DM #5, 2006 and DM #1, 2006).  
• “The prediction of large demographic declines predicted in the 1970s did not happen 
in a number of universities.  This may have lead Darwin and CES campus leaders to 
believe the 1990s would be like the 70s and 80s again” (DM #1, 2006). 
 
Expertise 
• “Many CES CEOs did not react or appropriately respond to the campus enrollment 
declines because they were either out of their element or had little control to affect 
enrollments” (DM #1, 2006). 
• “In the beginning, I did not have as complete an understanding of the individual 
campuses as I initially believed” (DM #5, 2006).   
 
 
Analysis of the enrollment declines was complicated by the availability of information to 
key members of the enrollment management organization.  Based on interview reports, there 
were both social and cognitive limitations to information processing and analysis.  The 
organizational structure influences access to information and consequently influences decision 
making (Carley and Behrens, 1999).  As some members reported, data and information access 
were a question and concerns.  One interview respondent reported that the demographic reports 
were not shared with her.  This lack of access hindered the ability to analyze and recognize the 
impending enrollment declines at the campus.  Two admissions officers commented they did not 
believe they had sufficient training and knowledge to interpret the data and information.  
Another interview report indicated that the high school demographic reports were widely 
distributed but were not widely discussed or understood.   
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4.7.2 Communications 
The purpose of communications is to influence decision making.  Each member of the 
organization possesses information that is relevant to the particular decision that must be made.  
In an organization structure like a multi-campus university with multiple layers, decision making 
is made more complex because decision makers must absorb and interpret a large volume of 
information and advice from a wide-array of organization members in a relatively short amount 
of time prior to a decision.  From the interviews and surveys of organization members there is 
consensus that the two-way flow of communications was problematic at a number of campuses.  
The lack of communication fragments information flow and advice relevant to decision making 
(Simon, 1997).  According to Bounded Rationality theory, this is an example of “satsficing”.  
The search for essential information through communication channels is truncated at both the 
campus levels and university-wide.   
Organization decision makers often choose information sources and communication 
channels even though the sources and channels are not optimal or are less productive (Simon and 
March, 1958).  O’Reilly (1982) uses the example of physicians learning of innovations in drugs 
from pharmaceutical sales representatives rather than reading the medical journal literature.  It is 
a communications shortcut to information. These biases influence communications volume and 
value.   
In organization hierarchies judgments are made of members opinions based on their 
location and perceived status (Wang and Ahmed, 2003).  One fact of organizational decision 
making is that personalities are essential ingredients to the process.  Decision makers are 
influenced by one individual or individuals versus another individual(s).     
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The admissions officers reported more often than other groups a belief that personalities 
were more important than they should have been in the communications process.  The CEPOs 
agreed with the admissions officers on this survey topic.  In interview reports, there was mention 
of the influence of certain personalities in the communications process. 
Organization members reported that the communication channels had difficulties.  In 
such a complex layered organization, this was not surprising.  The formal communication 
channels were only a small part of the information flow.  Organization members will choose 
channels that are more easily accessible even if quality of communication is lower (O’Reilly, 
1982).  The informal communications flow needed to be more robust.   
In fact, organization members reported there were other communication channels and 
forums available to discuss the enrollment declines.  These members reported that 
communications channels were available and effective.  They reported satisfaction with the 
formal and informal channels of communication.  Those organization members may have had 
positions in different points of the hierarchy and the communications channels that gave them a 
different vantage point and perception of communication quantity and quality (O’Reilly, 1982).   
Three survey questions on the topic of communications evidenced the most disagreement 
among admissions officers and campus executive officers.   
Based on the responses of admissions officers and the campus executive officers 
communications survey question three (3), there was a difference in responses about the flow of 
communications that facilitated discussion and insight between admissions officer and CEO.  
Admissions officers disagreed (4.80) and campus executive officers strongly believed (9.00) that 
there was a constant flow of communications between the two campus groups.   
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On Communications survey question 5, there was a difference in responses between the 
admissions officers and the CEOs.  Admissions officers believed (6.55) that personalities were 
more important than information and data in influencing enrollment planning decision making.  
Campus executive officers strongly disagreed (1.83).   
On survey question #10, campus admissions officers indicated (7.70) that personalities in 
the office of the dean of the Commonwealth Education System were more important than data 
and information in influencing decision making.  Campus executive officers (4.00) and Darwin 
decision makers (3.50) disagreed.   
 
Table 16 
Communications  
 
Representative Interview Data 
Campus Admissions Officers 
 
Communications at Campus Level 
• “Relationships and communications with CEPO and CEO were just adequate at best.  
Better communication was very needed at Wyoming.  Communication was filtered 
and this was not positive.  Communication went through a chain” (AO #5, 2006). 
• The admissions officer at Wyoming reported he had little contact with the CEO.  The 
campus executive officer was the main communicator with Darwin and 
Commonwealth Education System about the enrollment declines at the campus (AO 
#6, 2006).   
• “As the enrollment declines worsened at Dunmore, communications deteriorated and 
became difficult” (AO #5, 2006).    
• “More communication was very needed” (AO #5, 2006).  
• “After 1992, communications became closed at the Dunmore campus” (AO #5, 2006). 
 
Communications with Undergraduate Admissions Office 
• “Support from the Undergraduate Admissions Office was not good.  I often felt like I 
was alone contending with my campus’ enrollment declines” (AO #6, 2006).   
 
Personalities in Communications 
• “The personalities of some decision makers became more influential than their actual 
expertise” (AO #5, 2006).   
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Communications  
 
Representative Interview Data 
Campus Enrollment Planning Officers 
 
Communications at Campus Level 
• “Campus level communication was very good at Brunswick.  At Darwin University, 
you could always contact someone in the administration to ask questions and offer 
opinions” (CEPO #2, 2006). 
• “Communications did not flow both ways enough.  It was more one-sided.  Admissions 
officers were often isolated by the communications process” (CEPO #2, 2006).   
 
Communications with Darwin Decision Makers 
• “UAO was not responsive enough” (CEPO #2, 2006). 
• “Communication was not always effective.  UAO and CES had turmoil that created 
dysfunction for effective communication.   CES and UAO had serious communication 
and cooperation difficulties that resulted in disrespect for one another” (CEPO #2, 
2006).   
• “Communication channels were readily available at campus and Darwin” (CEPO #2, 
2006). 
 
Personalities in Communications 
• “Some people in CES and the UAO were more influential than others but that is 
normal” (CEPO #2, 2006).   
 
Campus Executive Officers 
 
Communications with Darwin Decision Makers 
• “Communications with Darwin was never very good.  Each campus had to fend for 
itself” (CEO #4, 2006). 
 
Darwin Central Administration 
 
Communications Networks 
• “Communications networks at CES and throughout Darwin University may have 
hindered information inputs and decision making” (DM #4, 2006).   
• “I believe that there was an organizational communications problem rather than a data 
and information problem” (DM #4, 2006).   
• A Darwin decision maker reported, the limitations of the communication networks 
may have had a very significant impact on appropriate knowledge creation to aid 
better decision making (DM #4, 2006). 
• “Communications were good from top to bottom.  Admissions officers were unhappy 
because their problems were not solved.  More forums were needed for the campus 
admissions officers to listen to them.  Morale lessons could have been learned here” 
(DM #2, 2006). 
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Communications  
 
Representative Interview Data 
 
Communications Volume and Membership 
• “There was not enough dialogue regarding the implications of the data and reports.  
The communications process was not good enough” (DM #4, 2006). 
• “Communication was open and timely at certain levels.  However, some people 
involved in the enrollment crisis were not included enough in the discussions” (DM 
#3, 2006).   
 
Personalities in Communications 
• “Liked Dr. Wayne but understood those who believed that he did not listen or often 
listened to some more than others” (DM #2, 2006). 
 
 
4.7.3 Information Search 
Based on the reports of organization members, the development of data and information for 
decision making was problematic. All survey respondents agreed that there was not too much 
data and information for effective decision making purposes. 
Members reported that information sharing was not complete among all relevant 
enrollment management organization members.  This is not uncommon in organizations 
(O’Reilly, 1982).   Organization members will have varying judgments of the quality of data and 
information.  The size of the organization, technology usage, time constraints and the pursuit of 
multiple objectives would influence information search, dissemination and evaluation by 
organization members (satisficing).  Also, organization members use information that is more 
easily accessible even though the information may not be as relevant.  Organization decision 
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makers give a higher value to verbal sources of information versus reports, external information 
sources or other written media.   
Many organization members reported a lack of external information and need for more 
primary market information.  Some campus decision makers expected the CES to develop 
market information.  There was no real central marketing unit to develop marketing information.  
Similar to Simon’s theory of satisficing, the search for more external and primary information 
was truncated.  The implication of this satisficing was incomplete knowledge for effective 
decision making.  One of the reasons cited for the lack of more external information was cost.  
This is a common thread in organizational decision making information searches.  The 
curtailment of information search is a feature of bounded rationality.  Its effect is to limit the 
choices of alternatives or possible solutions.   
All survey respondents agreed that there was not too much data and information for 
effective decision making purposes.  Admissions officers score was 2.90, CEPOs was 4.50, 
campus executive officers had an average 2.33 and Darwin respondents gave an average score of 
4.60 to this survey question 16. 
On survey question 18 pertaining to availability of appropriate information, admissions 
officers had the lowest score of all respondents (5.60).   
Admissions officers scored a low of 5.45 on the question on appropriate training to obtain 
and analyze data for admissions and enrollment planning purposes.  The other three groups were 
more confident in their training and abilities to obtain and analyze data.  The CEOs had the 
highest score of the groups at 8.67. 
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Both admissions officers (4.36) and CEPOs (4.70) did not believe that external sources of 
information were actively sought.  Campus executive officers (8.17) and Darwin decision makers 
(7.20) disagreed on average. 
On the question of different individuals having access to different information and its 
effect on decision making, both admissions officers (6.73) and CEPOs (6.30) believed that there 
were differences in access.  Darwin decision makers (5.40) moderately agreed that there were 
differences in access by individuals and information.  Campus executive officers (4.83) 
disagreed.   
Admissions officers (5.73), CEPOs (5.80) and Darwin decision makers (5.40) agreed that 
enrollment decision makers made appropriate interpretations of the data and information.  
Campus executive officers scores on average were much higher at 7.83. 
 
Table 17 
Information Search   
 
Representative Interview Data 
Admissions Officers 
 
Reports and Access 
• “These (high school) demographic reports went to the campus executive officers and not 
the admissions officer.  It was expected that the report would be shared with other campus 
enrollment planners including the admissions officer. This may not have happened at every 
campus” (AO #5, 2006).   
 
Analysis and Expertise 
• “We simply did not do the essential primary market research and analysis that was needed 
to develop solutions” (AO #5, 2006).  
• “Dunmore attempted to do a marketing analysis of its service area.  It was a weak effort” 
(AO #5, 2006).   
• Three interview informants reported there was no marketing expertise at UAO or CES until 
it was far too late (AO #1, 2006, CEPO #1, 2006 and CEPO #4, 2006). 
 
Campus Enrollment Planning Officers 
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Information Search   
 
Representative Interview Data 
 
Analysis and Expertise 
• “There was not a real discussion or action to acquire external expertise or knowledge” 
(CEPO #2, 2006).   
• “There was little expertise at the UAO.  The marketing unit did not contribute much to the 
development of analysis and possible solutions for better marketing and recruitment 
initiatives” (CEPO #2, 2006). 
 
External Search for Information 
• “There was not a real discussion or action to acquire external expertise or knowledge” 
(CEPO #2, 2006).   
 
Campus Executive Officers 
 
Reports and Access 
• “Data and reports were plentiful and helpful for planning and decision making” (CEO #4, 
2006). 
• “Information flow did take place but the CES Office, which had the capacity to interpret 
the information, did not do so except when asked a specific question by a specific campus.  
The question and the answer did not get shared across all campuses.  If this sharing took 
place, a lot of redundant work could have been eliminated.  Each campus did its own work.  
Information also flowed from the UAO but with little if any interpretation” (CEO #2, 
2005). 
 
Analysis and Expertise 
• “There were appropriate measures needed to meet enrollment needs.  We did market 
research studies to gauge our service area needs.  Mount Royal went out and wrote grant 
applications and got funds to do market research” (CEO #4, 2006). 
 
Darwin Central Administration 
 
Reports and Access 
• “There was plenty of data and reports, more was not needed” (DM #4, 2006).   
 
Analysis and Expertise 
• “Reports were needed to be formatted in new more insightful ways” (DM #4, 2006). 
• “The information people controlled the format of the data and information reports.   The 
format of the information could have the effect of influencing the interpretation of the 
various reports” (DM #5, 2006). 
• “Statistical reports were helpful but lacked evaluative properties to measure remedial 
actions” (DM #4, 2006).   
• “We had plenty of data.  But we didn’t have enough expertise and analysis” (DM #2, 
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Information Search   
 
Representative Interview Data 
2006).   
• “Not enough organizational memory to try and avoid past mistakes again” (DM #4, 2006).  
• “Enrollment decision makers tried to make appropriate interpretations of data but the 
discussion was at too high of a level.  It needed to include other members closer to the 
market place” (DM #3, 2006). 
• “Information expertise was there but was never harnessed and brought to task” (DM #4, 
2006). 
 
External Search for Information 
• “Recommendations to seek and use external sources of information were not approved by 
key decision makers” (DM #3, 2006).  
• “Although information was available, external information and sophisticated analysis was 
not used or available” (DM #3, 2006). 
• “We did not do enough external scanning and looking toward future and possible changes 
and developments” (DM#5, 2006).   
• “External sources of information were sought at CES central” (DM #4, 2006). 
 
 Darwin University did not possess the kind of marketing expertise to successfully solve 
its enrollment crisis.  The campus admissions officers lacked marketing expertise as did other 
campus enrollment planners.  Organization members reported that analysis was lacking.  This 
shortcoming extended to the decision makers in the undergraduate admissions office and at the 
Commonwealth Education System.   
When organizations are dissatisfied with the search for solutions to a problem, they 
usually continue the search for information and acquire appropriate expertise until a solution is 
found (Cyert and March, 1963).  Decision makers did attempt to address the need for greater 
expertise.  Two personnel additions were made in marketing and admissions for CES. They were 
added to the enrollment management hierarchy in 1993.  Even with their additional expertise, 
interview respondents at the campus level reported dissatisfaction with the degree of expertise 
and the quality of analysis for subsequent decision making.  Inexplicably, the expertise of the 
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marketing director was often ignored by decision makers in the undergraduate admissions office 
and in the Commonwealth Education System office.  Some organization members expressed 
dissatisfaction with the lack of inclusion of more organization members who may have been able 
to contribute meaningful advice for knowledge development.  Organizational learning is more 
robust when embedded in relationships between organization members (Carley and Behrens, 
1999). 
4.7.4 Decision Making 
This was a textbook illustration of the anarchic or garbage can decision making model.  The 
ultimate goal was to solve the enrollment declines of the campuses and the enrollment needs of 
the entire university.  The ambiguity was in the means of solution.  The solution would require a 
series of decisions and actions to address the enrollment crisis.  Complicating the decision 
making was the enrollment needs of the colleges at Darwin.  Their needs were always the first 
priority in enrollment planning.  This fact created a problematic decision making environment.   
The organization had to deal with a new and unique situation that was never encountered 
by the organization members before.  The enrollment planning decision makers did not have 
sufficient expertise to remedy the crisis.  The search and acquisition of external information or 
expertise was not further or completely explored.  In some cases expertise or advice was ignored 
or not utilized.  Available resources limited decision making latitude.  Expertise is based on 
extensive and expanding knowledge (Simon, 1991).    
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In the realm of Bounded Rationality theory, the decision makers involved did not fully 
understand the structure or dimensions of the problem and consequences of the decisions 
(Simon, 1957).  The decision makers did not fully understand the “state of the world” and the 
consequences of any possible decision(s).  This lack of knowledge implies that any possible 
solution can succeed or fail but decision makers do not know what decision or series of decisions 
will bring a solution to the enrollment crisis.  They were in uncharted waters.  And as one 
Darwin decision maker related in the interview, there was never a final decision made to solve 
the enrollment declines.   
Both admissions officers (4.91) and Darwin decision makers (4.00) did not believe that 
decisions were made to appropriately address the enrollment declines.   
The CEPOs (7.00) and campus executive officers (8.83) believed on average that 
decisions made did appropriately address the enrollment declines.  Four of the five Darwin 
decision makers did not believe that decisions were made that appropriately addressed the crisis.   
On the question of individual influence or input in the decision making for enrollment 
planning, admissions officers had the lowest scores (5.64).  Darwin decision makers had the 
second lowest average score at 6.00.  Both the CEPOs and campus executive officers had much 
higher average scores at 7.50 and 8.33 respectively.   
Campus admissions officers did not believe that they had much influence on the decision 
makers at the Commonwealth Education System office of the dean.  Of the three groups who 
responded to this question, admissions officers had the lowest average score of 3.44.  CEPOs had 
a score of 4.80 and campus executive officers gave this survey question 5.33. 
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Darwin decision makers did not believe that the campus enrollment decision makers had 
much influence in the office of the dean at the Commonwealth Education System.  The average 
score was 5.00.   
On the question of CEO influence in the office of the dean at the Commonwealth 
Education System, campus admissions officers on average (4.44) did not believe that the CEO 
had influence on decision makers.  All other groups disagreed.  The CEPOs (6.70) and CEOs 
(7.50) had the highest average scores for this question.  The Darwin decision makers slightly 
agreed (5.50) that the campus executive officers had influence. 
Was the decision making process logical and orderly?  Campus admission officers did 
not believe (4.27) the process was logical and orderly.  Of the four groups, admissions officers 
gave this survey question the lowest score.  The CEPOs had the second lowest score (5.00).  
Campus executive offices (6.17) and Darwin decision makers (5.80) agreed that the decision 
making process was orderly and logical.  Interview reports illustrate a higher degree of 
dissatisfaction with the decision making process that is not as apparent from the survey results.   
 
Table 18 
Decision making- Representative Interview Data 
Admissions Officers 
 
Limited Capabilities or Resources 
• “There was no change in academic offerings based on data and marketing analysis.  We 
continued to offer the same academic programs as if there was no enrollment decline and 
crisis” (AO #1, 2006).  
• “We lacked resources” (AO #5, 2006). 
• The admissions officer at Wyoming responded do more with less was the command.  More 
support from UAO was needed but never happened.  Campuses were under-resourced and 
could not successfully respond to the enrollment declines (AO #6, 2006). 
 
 96
Decision making- Representative Interview Data 
Decision Making Environment or Expertise 
• “The director of marketing and director of admissions for CES tried to help.  There was not 
enough expertise or resources at CES or UAO to make a difference” (AO #5, 2006).   
• “Darwin University, CES and UAO were too decentralized and lacked cohesion to 
accomplish goals.  We are too insular and inbred in management outlook” (AO #5, 2007). 
 
Campus Enrollment Planning Officer 
 
Limited Capabilities or Resources 
•  “Darwin University hired or promoted people to positions in marketing and recruitment 
and then gave them few resources or staff to reach needed goals” (CEPO #1, 2006). 
 
Decision Making Environment or Expertise 
• “No one in the university had the experience to turn this around and we were not permitted 
to bring in anyone external to try to fix the problems” (CEPO #1, 2006 ).  
• “No one wanted to make the hard decisions needed to remedy the enrollment crisis in CES” 
(CEPO #2, 2006).   
• A CEPO related Darwin muddled through hoping next year would be better.  The degree 
and quality of expertise and decision making varied at different levels of the administration 
in this time frame (CEPO #4, 2006).  
• “Because of the decision making at the campus level there was much bad morale because 
of a lack of ideas, candor and a close-minded mentality” (CEPO #1, 2006).   
• “Leadership at UAO became a revolving door” (CEPO #4, 2006).   
• “CES and UAO did not have an effective connection to work together in concerted ways 
that would impact enrollment goals” (CEPO #2, 2006). 
 
Campus Executive Officer  
 
Limited Capabilities or Resources 
• “The budget was a dreaded factor in management decisions at Darwin University.  It 
greatly limited decision latitude.  Darwin University was always exploring different budget 
models that complicated the decision making process” (CEO #4, 2006).   
 
Decision Making Environment or Expertise 
• “The problem, vis-a-vis, campus administration and CES Office seemed to be one of the 
CES Office ‘interfering’ with the campus’s administration.  This issue was discussed by the 
CEOs and the Dean but nothing was corrected: that is, the issue persisted” (CEO #2, 2005). 
 
Darwin Decision Maker 
Limited Capabilities and Resources 
• “Decision making and solution options were very limited.  Campuses and CES were 
between a rock and a hard place” (DM #2, 2006). 
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Decision making- Representative Interview Data 
Decision Making Environment or Expertise 
• “The colleges and departments controlled the academic program offerings and they did not 
want to share with the campuses” (DM #5, 2006).   
• “There was more crisis management rather than strategic planning” (DM #3, 2006). 
• “Evaluation was done but the information was not analyzed and then “go to” steps to 
possible solutions.  This is a Darwin University problem. Often a solution is suggested but 
is often ignored” (DM #4, 2006). 
• “CES and UAO understood the situation to a significant degree but they did not know how 
to effectively respond.  These were academics as administrators and not marketing 
professionals” (DM #3, 2006).   
• “There was never a final decision made for a remedy to the crisis” (DM #4, 2006). 
• “Decision making did not use enough primary data and research to guide decision making” 
(DM #3, 2006).  
• “Decision making was not logical or orderly.  It was really poor for a major university” 
(DM #3, 2006). 
 
  
Loose coupling was another factor that influenced the decision making environment.  The 
various members participated in decision making at various times and locations.  Participation 
was more fluid and irregular because participants were located throughout the state and their 
involvement was not always requested or available.  Some of the most important participants in 
the routine decision making process were completely uninvolved with the new problem.  The 
ability to offer academic programs was in the hands of the academic colleges at Darwin.  Only 
the departments and colleges had the authority to create new programs or allow the campuses to 
offer degree programs.  This did not happen. 
Similar to Birnbaum’s (1991) Huxley College example, the enrollment planners were 
confronted with such an array of decision alternatives that a solution may not have been possible 
given the time, expertise and resources available.  As a consequence, Darwin University 
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enrollment decision makers seemed to have muddled along until the crisis resolved itself by an 
upturn in both the economy and the demographics. 
4.8 RESULTS RESEARCH QUESTION 1 
Research question 1 asked: was the information relevant to aid and support decision making?  
All four groups agreed that data and information were crucial for enrollment planning decision 
making.  All four groups agreed that appropriate information was available for decision making.   
All respondent groups reported there was an abundance of data and information for 
decision making.   Respondents did not agree that access to data and information was an 
impediment for decision making.  However, survey respondents did agree different organization 
members had access to different information and this did affect decision making.  Interviews 
indicated that some reports that went to campus executive officers may not have been routinely 
shared with other campus decision makers including the admissions officers.  
Two survey groups did not agree that there was an active search for external sources of 
information.  The survey data revealed the admissions officers (4.36) and CEPOs (4.67) did not 
agree there was an active search for external information.  Individual interview reports support 
findings that organization members agreed that more external sources of information were 
needed.  This need included more primary market research. 
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Results For Research 
Question 1 
Admissions 
Officer 
Mean 
CEPO 
Mean 
CEO 
Mean
Darwin 
Mean 
Overall 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Information was 
incomplete for effective 
decision making. 
5.80 5.83 4.50 5.00 5.37 2.79 
There were too much 
data and information for 
effective decision 
making. 
2.90 4.50 2.33 4.60 3.44 2.45 
Access to information 
was difficult. 
5.10 5.67 4.50 4.20 4.93 2.64 
External sources of 
information were actively 
sought. 
4.36 4.67 8.17 6.00 5.54 2.81 
Different individuals had 
access to different 
information and this 
affected decision making. 
6.73 6.33 4.83 5.40 6.00 2.60 
Appropriate information 
was available for 
effective decision 
making. 
5.60 6.83 7.00 7.20 6.48 2.14 
4.9 RESULTS RESEARCH QUESTION 2 
Research question 2 asked: Were the decision makers overwhelmed by information and the 
complexity of the decision situation? It was believed that the most effective way to answer this 
question was through the interview data.  The comments from interview respondents strongly 
indicate a decision making environment and process that involved high volumes of data and 
information, and substantial complexity.  Decisions were made in crisis mode rather than as part 
of a strategic plan.  Examining the definition of the anarchic or garbage can model of decision 
making and comparing the survey responses and interview data, this case study fits the model 
very well.  Data, time, loose coupling, irregular participation, availability and most of all the 
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ambiguity of the problem and the solutions are all components of a complex decision making 
process. 
4.10 RESULTS RESEARCH QUESTION 3 
Research question 3 asked: Was decision making typified more by clarity and consistency or by 
ambiguity and inconsistency?  What was the degree of coordination and structure in the 
organization for decision making?  This is a university system with multiple campuses and 
multiple levels of participation and decision making, a loose coupled organization in an 
enrollment crisis.  On the survey question pertaining to the logic and orderliness of the decision 
making, four of the five Darwin decision makers agreed the process was logical and orderly.  
Two campus executive officers gave this survey question a five or lower score, indicating 
disagreement.  All other campus executive officers responses were more in agreement that the 
process had order and logic.  The CEPOs and admissions officers had a different perspective.  
Four of the six CEPOs did not find logic and order in the decision making process.  Only three of 
the 11 admissions officers indicated they agreed there was logic and order to the decision making 
process.   
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 Table 19 
Results For Research 
Question 3 
Admissions 
Officer 
Mean 
CEPO 
Mean 
CEO 
Mean
Darwin 
Mean 
Overall 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the 
Commonwealth 
Education System at 
Darwin had sufficient 
evidence of the 
possibility of enrollment 
declines through internal 
and external reports. 
8.45 8.17 8.67 9.60 8.64 1.66 
Campus decision makers 
fully understood the 
dimensions of the 
enrollment problems 
(economic recession, 
declining demographics, 
etc.). 
7.45 8.17 9.33 7.40 8.00 2.04 
The admission and 
enrollment management 
decision makers 
considered various 
alternatives prior to a 
decision. 
6.10 6.83 8.83 7.00 7.04 1.93 
Decisions were made 
that appropriately 
addressed the enrollment 
situation. 
4.91 7.00 8.83 4.00 6.04 2.74 
The decision making 
process was logical and 
orderly? 
4.27 5.00 6.17 5.80 5.11 2.64 
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4.11 RESULTS RESEARCH QUESTION 4 
 
Research question 4 asked: Since one or more individuals may monopolize the decision making 
process, were individual personalities more influential than information in the decision making 
process?   
The influence of personalities may have had an important impact on the decision making 
process.  Mean scores of the campus executive officers and Darwin decision makers reveal these 
two groups did not perceive that personalities were more influential than data and information in 
the decision process.  Interestingly, the individual responses to the survey questions about the 
influence of personalities shed light on the decision makers interpretation of personalities and 
decisions.  Two Darwin decision makers indicated in their survey responses that one or more 
campus executive officers may have been more influential than data and information.  Two 
campus executive officers out of six reported that personalities in the CES office were more 
influential than data and information for decision making. 
The admissions officers mean score on the question of personalities and influence on the 
campus was 6.55 in agreement that personalities were more influential than data at the campus 
level.  CEPOs agreed (6.83).  Their responses may suggest that faculty members played a role in 
enrollment planning decisions at the campus level.  Interviews did report that admissions officers 
and CEPOs mentioned faculty comments had influence at the campus level.    
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Table 20 
 Admissions 
Officer 
Mean 
CEPO 
Mean 
CEO 
Mean
Darwin 
Mean 
Overall 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Personalities were more 
important than information 
or data in influencing 
decision making on your 
campus pertaining to 
enrollment declines and 
planning. 
6.55 6.83 1.83 NR 5.39 3.04 
Personalities of campus 
executive officers were 
more important than 
information or data in 
influencing decision making 
pertaining to enrollment 
declines and planning. 
NR NR NR 5.75 5.75 1.50 
Personalities of decision 
makers in the Office of the 
Dean of the CES were more 
important than information 
or data in influencing 
decision making pertaining 
to university-wide 
enrollment issues and 
planning. 
7.70 7.50 4.00 3.50 6.15 2.84 
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5.0  SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 LESSONS LEARNED 
The development of the decision making process in enrollment management that most 
effectively address institutional goals and needs is still in a transitional phase at many large 
public research universities.  Enrollment management in the environment of a large public 
research university is growing in complexity.  Information management in the decision making 
process is a growing concern as sources, amounts and the rapidity of data and information 
increase.  New organizational structures are evolving as decision making tools are developed and 
become more sophisticated.  This research examined one university’s model of enrollment 
management and decision making process: how decisions were made; who were the decision 
makers and how was information used in the decision making process?  It went beyond analysis 
of functionalism and outcomes to examine the process from the perspective of the Carnegie 
School with its emphasis on information processing in organizational decision making.  It 
contributes to contemporary decision making theory in higher education administration and 
enrollment management. 
 The results of this study offer some insights and direction on the considerable difficulties 
involved in university decision making that involves multiple participations and time constraints.  
The use of the anarchic or garbage can decision making model and Bounded Rationality theory 
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provide a theoretical framework for understanding the real world circumstances of problems and 
solutions in the university by the literature and findings.  A review of the organizational decision 
making literature identified the Garbage Can Decision Making model as the most appropriate 
framework to critically analyze the Darwin University enrollment management decision process.   
The mechanics of organizational decision making are often times obvious.  In some 
instances though, it is a black box.  Decision participants often wonder how or why a particular 
decision or decisions are made.  What were the dynamics, decision inputs, data analysis and 
communications channels that informed decisions.  The elements of the black box are what 
stimulate observer and participants alike to want to learn more.  The many academic 
departments, administrative offices, missions and goals are often in conflict with one another for 
resources, participation and organization priority. 
The theory and model go a long way to explain the events of 1991 – 1995 at Darwin 
University.  Universities are organized anarchies.  At the same time, the models lend themselves 
to recommendations for change in organizational structure and decision making. 
5.1.1 Information and Knowledge Management   
The events of this case study actually begin prior to 1990.  Demographic reports were being 
produced both in-house and at the state department of education that predicting a decline in high 
school graduates in the state until 1995.  The first report this researcher was able to locate was 
dated 1979 (Newton).  The report was published each year into the 1990s.  The search for and 
sharing of information are basic components of knowledge creation that all organizations require 
for understanding their environments and reaching organizational goals (Cyert and March, 
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1963).  Interview data indicates that essential reports and information were not being shared at 
all levels of the enrollment management hierarchy.  The circulation and discussions of 
information through both formal and informal communications channels were not evident at 
Darwin University in 1991.   
Because there was no early discussion of the demographic projections, there was no early 
warning.  Other than the campus admissions officer, there really was no other enrollment expert 
at the individual campuses.  There were organization members communicating the information 
about demographic declines and the implications for Darwin University.  In the loose coupled 
environment of the university, the message was unheard.  Various units pursued their assigned 
responsibilities and duties.  Decision makers were not devoting enough time and effort in this 
area because of multiple duties in other areas of organizational activities.  In the garbage can 
decision model, this is not surprising.   
The importance of knowledge development and management is crucial to potential 
problem recognition and subsequent decision making.  In the garbage can model, the many levels 
and loose couplings of the organization lack a cohesion that in the case of enrollment 
management is imperative.  It is recommended that the enrollment management structure 
develop information systems that are shared and available to a wide range of organizational 
members both within the enrollment management administration and outside to related offices.  
The enrollment management process engages the questions fundamental to bringing together 
effective communications channels, information management linked to effective decision 
making. 
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At all levels, enrollment management decision makers reported that there was sufficient 
information and knowledge of the possibility of enrollment declines.  Of course, there were other 
factors that were not known or fully understood by enrollment decision makers.  Some of the 
academic degree programs had become obsolete.  Associate degree programs which had been a 
backbone of the CES campus enrollments, declined in popularity with no new academic 
programs to replace them.  At many campuses, adult enrollments declined for a variety of 
reasons.   
 The undergraduate admissions office at Darwin University was not designed to market 
and recruit as much as to manage applications and admit new students to meet enrollment goals.  
The office lacked expertise to do actual marketing data collection and analysis.  Also, the office 
did not purchase external data and information that would have better informed forecasting and 
decision making for enrollment planning.  Primary research for marketing was not an intrinsic 
duty of the undergraduate admissions office.  And the university did not have an office dedicated 
to university-wide marketing initiatives.  Primary data collection and analysis would develop and 
incubate tacit knowledge. 
5.1.2 Recognition and Definition of Problem 
Most large universities lack the sophisticated mechanisms to do early recognition of problems 
related to enrollment declines.  Trends are often times difficult to pinpoint in a short time frame.  
At a multi-campus and multi-college university like Darwin University, the ability to accomplish 
early problem recognition was extremely difficult given the numbers, resources, time frame and 
expertise involved.  In addition, there was no organizational memory to rely on for guidance.   
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The enrollment declines were not uniform.  Some campuses started to experience 
declines prior to 1990, while others did not experience a decline until 1993.  And some campuses 
never experienced an enrollment drop at all in this time period.  So, there was not a clear system-
wide recognition of the impending enrollment declines.  Various members of the enrollment 
management hierarchy were not fully aware of the coming declines nor did they comprehend the 
dimensions of the possible declines.  In addition, not everyone was in possession of the relevant 
data and information prior to 1990 predicting declines in traditional-age high school graduates in 
Northern.  In the time frame leading up to 1990, there was not very much in-depth discussion of 
the demographics and enrollment reports.  In retrospect, this was a pivotal failure in information 
and knowledge building that is essential to organizational decision making.   
In most cases, the early warnings about the campus enrollment declines was either 
ignored or not given sufficient attention because campus decision makers had never encountered 
a decline at Darwin University.  Also, campus decision makers may well have perceived as one 
Darwin enrollment management decision maker stated to me, declines had been predicted before 
but never materialized.  The prevailing sentiment may have been that someone was crying wolf 
again (V. Adams, personal communication, June 16, 2006). 
 The next phase of problem recognition is the diagnosis of the problem.  This proved to be 
even more problematic than recognition.  The enrollment declines had a variety of causes that 
made diagnosis difficult.  Campus decision makers each faced unique situations that obscured a 
university-wide enrollment decline and Darwin University enrollment planners heard different 
reasons and intuited their own diagnosis.  Relevant decision makers may not have been watching 
the enrollment trends or the essential reports predicting possible declines. 
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5.1.3 Communications 
Probably, the most important aspect of an organization is communications.  We all need to listen 
or be heard.  According to Simon (1991), the communications process is also part of the 
information development process in decision making.  Channels of communication start at the 
local level.  Dialogue between the admissions officer and campus executive officer in a number 
of cases was lacking.  The causes included poor relationships or ineffective channels of 
communication.  Another often mentioned influence was the voice of the faculty.  Campus 
admissions officers and enrollment planning officers mentioned faculty were not sympathetic to 
the plight of the admissions officers.  Campus executive officers may have listened to faculty 
more than admissions officers.  In organizational hierarchies, lower status members are listened 
to less than other higher status members in the hierarchy.  Admissions officers believed that lack 
of respect on the part of faculty and the leadership of the campus hindered their effectiveness and 
influence at higher levels of the enrollment planning hierarchy.  The addition of the campus 
enrollment planning officers did not appreciably improve the quantity and quality of essential 
communication.  Admissions officers truly believed that they were not respected on their 
campuses or at the Commonwealth Education System central office at Darwin.   
Communications in organizations is a two-way process.  More effective forums or 
channels for communication were needed within hierarchy.  The size and structure of a multi-
campus university affected the upward flow of information and advice to decision makers within 
the hierarchy.  The downward flow of decisions and orders was likewise affected.  One area of 
communications flow that many enrollment management decision makers agreed was available 
and open was informal channels of communication:  The campus enrollment planning officer 
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had access to one or more members of the CES central staff at Darwin; admissions officers did 
have access to decision maker(s) in the undergraduate admissions office; and campus executive 
officers had regular access to a variety of forums through committee memberships and councils.   
Lines of communication were seriously frayed.  The relationship between the 
undergraduate admissions office and the Commonwealth Education System decision makers was 
not good.  More than one decision maker interviewed indicated there were serious issues of 
respect and confidence involved.  Some decision makers at CES questioned the marketing and 
recruitment expertise of the undergraduate admissions office.  Members of the undergraduate 
admissions office staff believed that the CES decision makers were unfair in their judgments and 
actions.  This impeded the essential two-way communication flow.  Distrust built up in this time 
period that hindered an essential exchange of information, knowledge and advice that could aid 
in formulating tactics and strategies to remedy the enrollment declines.  Because of personality 
conflicts that involved other units, there were communications problems related to the 
advertising and promotion functions of recruitment.  Unfortunately, the leadership in the 
undergraduate admissions office was experiencing turmoil.   
Decisions are usually time sensitive. The longer a delay between decision and action the 
greater the costs in time and personnel.  These delays could have hindered possible remedies to 
the enrollment declines that were affecting the campuses.   
Communication could overload decision maker’s ability to process and comprehend 
information and advice.  At the upper levels of the enrollment planning hierarchy, some decision 
makers indicated that they were not overwhelmed by data, information and communications.  It 
is not hard to believe that some decision makers filtered out information that was “bad news” or 
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did not fit with pre-conceptions of the dynamics of the enrollment landscape and their possible 
remedies.   
However, there were individuals aware of the shortcomings in the communications 
matrix.  One enrollment planner reported that the campus admissions officers needed more 
forums for communications and advice giving.  A secondary reason for this recommendation 
pertained to organizational morale.  Other interview respondents reported the need for more 
involvement and better communications.   
5.1.4 Information Search 
Most participants agreed that there was plenty of information and data available to aid the 
decision making process.  However, there was not complete agreement that the data and 
information was able to inform decision making.  Some respondents indicated that access and 
formatting of the information was difficult.  Campus admissions officers were split on the value 
of the information available for decision making.  Campus enrollment planning officers were in 
unanimous agreement that available information was valuable for decision making.  A majority 
of campus executive officers reported that there was appropriate information for effective 
decision making.  All of the decision makers at the Darwin flagship campus in CES and the 
undergraduate admissions office indicated the information available was valuable for decision 
making purposes.   
Importantly, there was a range of responses to the questions of difficulty of access, the 
completeness of the information, volume of information and the question of external 
information.  The questions pertaining to access and the formatting of information reports are 
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important.  The amount of data and information was quite extensive.  However, the information 
was located in a variety of places both in paper form as well as electronic sources.  This almost 
certainly presented difficulties for decision makers.  The question of how information reports 
were formatted influences how the reports are read and interpreted by a reader (Drucker, 1999 
and Mintzberg, 1975).  Data and information reports are most often created by main frame 
programmers who are less concerned with interpretation than with a format that is concise and 
easy to read.  More than one interviewed decision maker felt the formatting of the data and 
information was inadequate or influenced their interpretation of the data.   
 Campus admissions officers and at least one CES decision maker said there was a lack of 
external information available that could have influenced decision making.  The College Board 
and ACT produce reports that use test taker information that colleges and universities across the 
country use for marketing and enrollment planning purposes.  Financial aid data could have been 
more helpful if collected and used to provide a better picture of applicants to Darwin University. 
5.1.5 Decision Making 
Human behavior is an intrinsic element of organizations and decision making.  Objective 
rationality is not possible.  Bounded Rationality theory is predicated on this inescapable fact.  
People make the decisions.  The difficulties that were encountered involved ambiguity, limited 
capabilities, biases, limited rationality, incomplete knowledge and quasi-resolution.   
The decision making process in a university is often complicated by the nature of the 
decision making process itself.  The multi channels of communication, departments and 
participants involved and their availability for decisions, information and knowledge all are 
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major determinants for decisions.  Because of the loose coupling of pertinent organization units 
and the availability of information, decision makers frequently have fragmentary knowledge of 
the problem and because of time constraints cannot devote the needed time for the decision 
making process.  The result is the principle of “satisficing”, i.e., making due rather than an 
optimal decision.   
 Goals are often ambiguous as in this case study.  The problem was a prolonged period of 
enrollment declines that affected the university and many campuses.  The possible solutions and 
decisions involved were much more ambiguous.  There was no one solution or decision that 
would have remedied the enrollment declines.  Not every campus had the exact same cause of 
enrollment decline.  Not all of the decision makers had expertise in the areas of marketing, 
recruitment and enrollment management to be able to make an appropriate decision to affect 
enrollments.  Also, in this case the academic colleges that controlled and authorized new 
academic programs were not part of the decision making process.   
5.1.6 Conclusion 
Using the lens of Bounded Rationality Theory and the Anarchic or Garbage Can model of 
decision making can be a useful way to examine the way university organizational units 
approach problems involving uncertainty and ambiguity. 
This case study highlights the difficulties involved in decision making at a major 
university.  Darwin University faced a turbulent environment and had little experience and 
internal knowledge for crafting an appropriate response to try and remedy enrollment declines 
that caused multi-million dollar losses.   
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The interplay of the personalities is a very powerful influence.  The topic of personalities 
in decision making needs further exploration.  It is a sensitive subject and requires knowledge of 
organizational behavior and group dynamics, and other branches of psychology. 
A second area for future research would be the realm of decision making support 
systems.  If desktop computers with greater power to process data and information were more 
accessible and ubiquitous, decision makers may have been able to make faster problem 
recognition and possibly better decisions.  The development of more powerful data and 
information processors continues unabated.  Universities spend great amounts each year to 
remain state-of-the-art in technology.  Yet in the realm of institutional decision making, there is 
little development or spending to develop forecasting or decision support systems. 
The other area of organizational decision making in higher education that is most 
interesting but ancillary to this case study: is the belief that administration and decision making 
is more about process than expertise.  Darwin University placed people into decision making 
positions with little or no expertise or knowledge in enrollment planning and management.  
Darwin is not unique.  This seems to be more true at large public research universities.  These 
same universities would not think of hiring an athletic coach without an impressive resume of 
coaching experience and significant accomplishment over a number of years on the athletic field.   
The implications are obvious.   
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EPILOGUE 
The 1994-1997 strategic plan for the Commonwealth Education System emphasized the need to 
do more marketing research and collaborate with the academic colleges to develop degree 
programs most needed by state residents close to their homes.  The plan emphasized the need to 
work more closely with the undergraduate admissions office to obtain and utilize market 
research and data.  In 1998, the Darwin University administration formed an office of marketing 
and advertising within the university relations unit.  Its stated mission was to function like a 
market research and advertising agency.   
 Beginning in 2001, the nation experienced an economic recession.  Many public 
institutions of higher education were adversely affected by severe cuts in state appropriations 
from 2002 to 2005.  Darwin University raised tuition 7.8 percent in 2001, 13.5 percent in 2002, 
9.8 percent in 2003 and 6.6 percent in 2004 (Elizabeth, July 2004).   Darwin’s enrollment 
declined from 83,038 in 2002 to 80,124 in 2005 (Horan, November 2006).  The Commonwealth 
Education System lost over 2,500 students.  In 2003, the Commonwealth Education System hired 
a director of marketing.  Enrollments rebounded in the fall of 2006.  Projections of high school 
graduates indicate the number of graduates in the state will peak in 2009. Predicted declines in 
high school graduates will continue through 2016.    
 
APPENDIX A 
MEAN SCORES OF ALL SURVEY RESPONDENTS BY GROUP 
 
  
Admissions 
Officer 
Mean 
CEPO 
Mean 
CEO 
Mean 
Central 
Admin. 
Mean 
Overall 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Problem Recognition and Defining Problem       
1 Were the enrollment declines that your campus 
experienced significant in the early 1990s? 5.40 5.50 3.67 7.25 5.31 3.11 
2 Campus decision makers had sufficient evidence of the 
possibility of enrollment declines through internal and 
external reports. 7.55 8.33 8.67 9.00 8.19 2.11 
3 Decision makers in the Office of the Dean of the 
Commonwealth Education System at Darwin had  
sufficient evidence of the possibility of enrollment declines 
through internal and external reports. 8.45 8.17 8.67 9.60 8.64 1.66 
4 Campus decision makers fully understood the dimensions 
of the enrollment problems (economic recession, declining 
demographics, etc.). 7.45 8.17 9.33 7.40 8.00 2.04 
5 There was timely recognition and response by campus 
decision makers to the downward trend in enrollments. 4.73 6.00 8.67 5.00 5.93 3.02 
6 There was timely recognition and response by decision 
makers in the Office of the Dean of the CES to the 
downward trend in enrollments. 3.70 5.00 5.83 5.60 4.81 2.72 
7 The response of campus decision makers was based on an 4.64 6.50 9.33 6.00 6.29 3.13 
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Admissions 
Officer 
Mean 
CEPO 
Mean 
CEO 
Mean 
Central 
Admin. 
Mean 
Overall 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
understanding of the available data and information to 
support decision making. 
8 The response of the decision makers in the Office of the 
Dean of the CES at Darwin was based on an understanding 
of the available data and information to support decision 
making. 3.90 5.00 6.00 8.50 5.35 2.71 
 Communications       
1 The communication process between admissions officers 
and campus executive officers was open and timely in 
quantity and quality. 6.20 8.17 9.33 NR 7.59 2.59 
2 The communication process between campus admissions 
officers and decision makers in the Office of the Dean of 
the CES was open and timely in quantity and quality. 4.56 4.50 7.00 NR 5.24 2.74 
3 There was a constant flow of communications that 
facilitated discussion and insight between the campus 
admissions officer and the campus executive officer. 4.80 7.33 9.00 NR 6.64 3.00 
4 Communication process from campus admissions officers 
to campus executive officers was frank and candid. 8.20 9.00 9.17 NR 8.68 2.01 
5 Personalities were more important than information or data 
in influencing decision making on your campus pertaining 
to enrollment declines and planning. 6.55 6.83 1.83 NR 5.39 3.04 
6 The communication process between campus enrollment 
officers and executive officers and decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES was open and timely in 
quantity and quality. NR NR NR 5.40 5.40 2.88 
7 There was a constant flow of communications that 
facilitated discussion and insight between the campus 
executive officer and decision makers in the Office of the 
Dean of the CES. NR NR NR 4.75 4.75 3.50 
8 The communication process from campus admissions and NR NR NR 4.67 4.67 3.51 
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Admissions 
Officer 
Mean 
CEPO 
Mean 
CEO 
Mean 
Central 
Admin. 
Mean 
Overall 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
enrollment officers to campus executive officers was an 
important source of information for CES decision makers. 
9 Personalities of campus executive officers were more 
important than information or data in influencing decision 
making pertaining to enrollment declines and planning. NR NR NR 5.75 5.75 1.50 
10 Personalities of decision makers in the Office of the Dean 
of the CES were more important than information or data 
in influencing decision making pertaining to university-
wide enrollment issues and planning. 7.70 7.50 4.00 3.50 6.15 2.84 
 Information Search       
1 Information was incomplete for effective decision making. 5.80 5.83 4.50 5.00 5.37 2.79 
2 There were too much data and information for effective 
decision making. 2.90 4.50 2.33 4.60 3.44 2.45 
3 Access to information was difficult. 5.10 5.67 4.50 4.20 4.93 2.64 
4 Appropriate information was available for effective 
decision making. 5.60 6.83 7.00 7.20 6.48 2.14 
5 You believed that you were well trained to obtain and 
analyze data for admission and recruitment decision 
making. 5.45 7.00 8.67 7.20 6.79 2.71 
6 External sources of information were actively sought. 4.36 4.67 8.17 6.00 5.54 2.81 
7 Different individuals had access to different information 
and this affected decision making. 6.73 6.33 4.83 5.40 6.00 2.60 
8 The prospect and application AIDAA report generator was 
an important source of information. 7.64 7.17 6.20 7.40 7.22 2.12 
9 Data and information were crucial for enrollment and 
recruitment decisions. 8.64 7.83 8.67 8.00 8.36 1.57 
10 There was a need for the development of information 
reports that could be used for forecasting purposes. 9.55 8.33 8.17 6.20 8.39 1.81 
11 Enrollment decision makers made appropriate 5.73 5.83 7.83 5.40 6.14 2.19 
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Admissions 
Officer 
Mean 
CEPO 
Mean 
CEO 
Mean 
Central 
Admin. 
Mean 
Overall 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
interpretations of the data and information. 
 Decision Making       
1 The admission and enrollment management decision 
makers considered various alternatives prior to a decision. 6.10 6.83 8.83 7.00 7.04 1.93 
2 Decisions were made that appropriately addressed the 
enrollment situation. 4.91 7.00 8.83 4.00 6.04 2.74 
3 You believed that you had input or influence in the 
decision making processes of enrollment planning. 5.64 7.50 8.33 6.00 6.68 2.84 
4 Campus admissions officers did have influence on decision 
makers in the Office of the Dean of the CES? 3.44 4.83 5.33 NA 4.38 2.54 
5 Campus enrollment planners did have influence on 
decision makers in the Office of the Dean of the CES? NA NA NA 5.00 5.00 1.41 
6 Campus executive officers did have influence on decision 
makers in the Office of the Dean of the CES? 4.44 5.00 7.5 5.50 5.52 2.41 
7 The decision making process was logical and orderly? 4.27 5.00 6.17 5.80 5.11 2.64 
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APPENDIX B 
CAMPUS ADMISSIONS OFFICERS SURVEY RESULTS 
 
 Brunswick Capital Dunmore Monroe Flagler 
Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
 
Problem 
Recognition and 
Defining 
Problem             
1 
Were the 
enrollment 
declines that 
your campus 
experienced 
significant in the 
early 1990s? 10 3 10 1 3 1 9 NR 5 9 3 3.72 3.82 
2 
Campus decision 
makers had 
sufficient 
evidence of the 
possibility of 
enrollment 
declines through 
internal and 
external reports. 1 9 9 10 10 7 6 10 9 8 4 2.88 .27 
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 Brunswick Capital Dunmore Monroe Flagler 
Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
3 
Decision makers 
in the Office of 
the Dean of the 
Commonwealth 
Education 
System at 
Darwin had a 
sufficient 
evidence of the 
possibility of 
enrollment 
declines through 
internal and 
external reports. 3 10 9 9 10 9 8 10 9 8 8 1.97 .87 
4 
Campus decision 
makers fully 
understood the 
dimensions of 
the enrollment 
problems 
(economic 
recession, 
declining 
demographics, 
etc.). 9 8 7 10 10 6 9 10 3 6 4 2.46 .07 
5 
There was timely 
recognition and 
response by 
campus decision 
makers to the 
downward trend 
in enrollments. 2 3 4 9 7 9 3 1 4 6 4 2.69 .22 
6 
There was timely 
recognition and 
response by 
decision makers 
in the Office of 
the Dean of the 2 3 3 NR 5 8 2 1 5 6 2 2.21 .90 
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 Brunswick Capital Dunmore Monroe Flagler 
Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
CES to the 
downward trend 
in enrollments. 
7 
The response of 
campus decision 
makers was 
based on an 
understanding of 
the available data 
and information 
to support 
decision making. 2 3 4 10 7 8 3 1 4 6 3 2.77 .65 
8 
 The response of 
the decision 
makers in the 
Office of the 
Dean of the CES 
at Darwin was 
based on an 
understanding of 
the available data 
and information 
to support 
decision making. 2 3 3 NR 5 8 2 1 5 6 4 2.13 .54 
 
Communication
s Process              
1 
The 
communication 
process between 
admissions 
officers and 
campus 
executive 
officers was 
open and timely 
in quantity and 
quality. 9 3 6 10 7 10 4 NR 4 3 6 2.74 .51 
2 The 9 3 3 NR 5 8 2 NR 5 3 3 2.46 
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 Brunswick Capital Dunmore Monroe Flagler 
Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
communication 
process between 
campus 
admissions 
officers and 
decision makers 
in the Office of 
the Dean of the 
CES was open 
and timely in 
quantity and 
quality. 
.03 
3 
There was a 
constant flow of 
communications 
that facilitated 
discussion and 
insight between 
the campus 
admissions 
officer and the 
campus 
executive officer. 2 4 3 9 7 9 4 NR 4 2 4 2.62 .84 
4 
Communication 
process from 
campus 
admissions 
officers to 
campus 
executive 
officers was 
frank and candid. 9 9 9 10 9 8 8 NR 10 2 8 2.30 .29 
5 
Personalities 
were more 
important than 
information or 
data in 
influencing 9 9 8 1 8 3 9 9 5 6 5 2.77 .67 
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 Brunswick Capital Dunmore Monroe Flagler 
Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
decision making 
on your campus 
pertaining to 
enrollment 
declines and 
planning. 
6 
The 
communication 
process between 
campus 
enrollment 
officers and 
executive 
officers and 
decision makers 
in the Office of 
the Dean of the 
CES was open 
and timely in 
quantity and 
quality. NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 0.00 
7 
There was a 
constant flow of 
communications 
that facilitated 
discussion and 
insight between 
the campus 
executive officer 
and decision 
makers in the 
Office of the 
Dean of the CES. NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 0.00 
8 
The 
communication 
process from 
campus 
admissions and NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 0.00 
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 Brunswick Capital Dunmore Monroe Flagler 
Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
enrollment 
officers to 
campus 
executive 
officers was an 
important source 
of information 
for CES decision 
makers. 
9 
Personalities of 
campus 
executive 
officers were 
more important 
than information 
or data in 
influencing 
decision making 
pertaining to 
enrollment 
declines and 
planning. NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 0.00 
10 
Personalities of 
decision makers 
in the Office of 
the Dean of the 
CES were more 
important than 
information or 
data in 
influencing 
decision making 
pertaining to 
university-wide 
enrollment issues 
and planning. 9 9 10 NR 8 8 9 9 2 5 8 2.41 .79 
 
Information 
Seeking             
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 Brunswick Capital Dunmore Monroe Flagler 
Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
1 
Information was 
incomplete for 
effective 
decision making. 8 5 9 1 8 4 9 NR 1 4 9 3.22 0.4 
2 
There were too 
much data and 
information for 
effective 
decision making. 1 8 5 1 3 4 2 NR 1 2 2 2.23 .99 
3 
Access to 
information was 
difficult. 2 3 6 5 8 4 9 NR 1 4 9 2.85 .10 
4 
Appropriate 
information was 
available for 
effective 
decision making. 6 9 3 5 4 8 6 NR 10 3 2 2.72 .38 
5 
You believed 
that you were 
well trained to 
obtain and 
analyze data for 
admission and 
recruitment 
decision making. 9 6 2 6 8 8 5 1 9 4 2 2.91 .47 
6 
External sources 
of information 
were actively 
sought. 1 5 4 5 6 7 2 1 9 2 6 2.62 .85 
7 
Different 
individuals had 
access to 
different 
information and 
this affected 
decision making. 1 8 10 4 9 4 9 10 3 8 8 3.13 .82 
8 
The prospect and 
application 10 6 6 10 7 6 7 10 7 9 6 1.75 .05 
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 Brunswick Capital Dunmore Monroe Flagler 
Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
AIDAA report 
generator was an 
important source 
of information. 
9 
Data and 
information were 
crucial for 
enrollment and 
recruitment 
decisions. 5 9 10 9 10 6 9 10 8 9 10 1.69 .85 
10 
There was a need 
for the 
development of 
information 
reports that could 
be used for 
forecasting 
purposes. 10 10 10 9 9 8 10 10 10 9 10 0.69 .47 
11 
Enrollment 
decision makers 
made appropriate 
interpretations of 
the data and 
information. 8 3 3 8 7 6 4 5 9 6 4 2.10 .42 
 
Decision 
Making Process             
1 
The admission 
and enrollment 
management 
decision makers 
considered 
various 
alternatives prior 
to a decision. 9 4 4 9 7 8 NR 6 5 5 4 2.02 .10 
2 
Decisions were 
made that 
appropriately 
addressed the 1 3 3 9 6 8 3 6 4 8 3 2.63 .89 
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 Brunswick Capital Dunmore Monroe Flagler 
Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
enrollment 
situation. 
3 
You believed 
that you had 
input or 
influence in the 
decision making 
processes of 
enrollment 
planning. 1 2 3 10 8 8 5 6 5 9 5 2.91 .45 
4 
Campus 
admissions 
officers did have 
influence on 
decision makers 
in the Office of 
the Dean of the 
CES? 1 2 1 NR 6 4 2 NR 6 8 1 2.65 .03 
5 
Campus 
enrollment 
officers did have 
influence on 
decision makers 
in the Office of 
the Dean of the 
CES? NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR  
6 
Campus 
executive 
officers did have 
influence on 
decision makers 
in the Office of 
the Dean of the 
CES? 2 2 5 NR 6 6 5 NR 5 6 3 1.67 .78 
7 
The decision 
making process 
was logical and 
orderly? 1 2 3 9 6 7 2 3 3 7 4 2.57 .62 
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Mount 
Royal North  PCRC Scarborough Wyoming Young Mean S. D. 
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APPENDIX C 
CAMPUS ENROLLMENT PLANNING OFFICERS SURVEY RESULTS 
 
 Bennett Brunswick Hamilton North Wyoming Young Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Problem Recognition and Defining 
Problem 
       
Were the enrollment declines that your 
campus experienced significant in the 
early 1990s? 8 3 2 7 7 6 5.50 2.43 
Campus decision makers had sufficient 
evidence of the possibility of enrollment 
declines through internal and external 
reports. 9 8 8 7 9 9 8.33 0.82 
Decision makers in the Office of the 
Dean of the Commonwealth Education 
System at Darwin had a sufficient 
evidence of the possibility of enrollment 
declines through internal and external 
reports. 10 8 8 8 6 9 8.17 1.33 
Campus decision makers fully 
understood the dimensions of the 9 8 9 9 8 6 8.17 1.17 
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 Bennett Brunswick Hamilton North Wyoming Young Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
enrollment problems (economic 
recession, declining demographics, 
etc.). 
There was timely recognition and 
response by campus decision makers to 
the downward trend in enrollments. 1 9 7 8 3 8 6.00 3.22 
There was timely recognition and 
response by decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES to the 
downward trend in enrollments. 1 4 7 7 2 9 5.00 3.16 
The response of campus decision 
makers was based on an understanding 
of the available data and information to 
support decision making. 1 9 8 8 5 8 6.50 3.02 
 The response of the decision makers in 
the Office of the Dean of the CES at 
Darwin was based on an understanding 
of the available data and information to 
support decision making. 1 6 6 6 2 9 5.00 2.97 
Communications         
The communication process between 
admissions officers and campus 
executive officers was open and timely 
in quantity and quality. 4 10 10 7 9 9 8.17 2.32 
The communication process between 
campus admissions officers and 
decision makers in the Office of the 
Dean of the CES was open and timely 
in quantity and quality. 1 2 6 6 3 9 4.50 3.02 
There was a constant flow of 
communications that facilitated 
discussion and insight between the 
campus admissions officer and the 
campus executive officer. 3 10 9 5 8 9 7.33 2.73 
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 Bennett Brunswick Hamilton North Wyoming Young Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Communication process from campus 
admissions officers to campus executive 
officers was frank and candid. 10 10 9 6 10 9 9.00 1.55 
Personalities were more important than 
information or data in influencing 
decision making on your campus 
pertaining to enrollment declines and 
planning. 7 5 9 8 8 4 6.83 1.94 
The communication process between 
campus enrollment officers and 
executive officers and decision makers 
in the Office of the Dean of the CES 
was open and timely in quantity and 
quality. NR NR NR NR NR NR   
There was a constant flow of 
communications that facilitated 
discussion and insight between the 
campus executive officer and decision 
makers in the Office of the Dean of the 
CES. NR NR NR NR NR NR   
The communication process from 
campus admissions and enrollment 
officers to campus executive officers 
was an important source of information 
for CES decision makers. NR NR NR NR NR NR   
Personalities of campus executive 
officers were more important than 
information or data in influencing 
decision making pertaining to 
enrollment declines and planning. NR NR NR NR NR NR   
0 
Personalities of decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES were 
more important than information or data 
in influencing decision making 9 8 9 8 8 3 7.50 2.26 
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 Bennett Brunswick Hamilton North Wyoming Young Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
pertaining to university-wide enrollment 
issues and planning. 
        
Information Seeking        
Information was incomplete for 
effective decision making. 4 5 8 8 8 2 5.83 2.56 
There were too much data and 
information for effective decision 
making. 5 1 9 7 3 2 4.50 3.08 
Access to information was difficult. 8 4 6 8 4 4 5.67 1.97 
Appropriate information was available 
for effective decision making. 6 8 6 6 6 9 6.83 1.33 
You believed that you were well trained 
to obtain and analyze data for admission 
and recruitment decision making. 9 9 4 6 5 9 7.00 2.28 
External sources of information were 
actively sought. 1 9 5 4 3 6 4.67 2.73 
Different individuals had access to 
different information and this affected 
decision making. 3 6 7 8 8 6 6.33 1.86 
The prospect and application AIDAA 
report generator was an important 
source of information. 5 9 5 6 8 10 7.17 2.14 
Data and information were crucial for 
enrollment and recruitment decisions. 6 8 6 7 10 10 7.83 1.83 
0 
There was a need for the development 
of information reports that could be 
used for forecasting purposes. 5 10 8 9 9 9 8.33 1.75 
1 
Enrollment decision makers made 
appropriate interpretations of the data 
and information. 3 6 7 6 4 9 5.83 2.14 
Decision Making         
The admission and enrollment 4 7 9 6 6 9 6.83 1.94 
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 Bennett Brunswick Hamilton North Wyoming Young Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
management decision makers 
considered various alternatives prior to 
a decision. 
Decisions were made that appropriately 
addressed the enrollment situation. 2 8 9 7 7 9 7.00 2.61 
You believed that you had input or 
influence in the decision making 
processes of enrollment planning. 4 9 9 4 9 10 7.50 2.74 
Campus admissions officers did have 
influence on decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES? 3 5 5 3 4 9 4.83 2.23 
Campus enrollment officers did have 
influence on decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES? NR NR NR NR NR NR   
Campus executive officers did have 
influence on decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES? 4 NR NR 3 4 9 6.67 3.33 
The decision making process was 
logical and orderly? 2 3 10 4 2 9 5.00 3.58 
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APPENDIX D 
CAMPUS EXECUTIVE OFFICERS SURVEY RESULTS 
 
 Bennett Dunmore 
Mount 
Royal Scarborough Wadsworth  York Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Problem Recognition and Defining 
Problem      
1 
Were the enrollment declines that 
your campus experienced significant 
in the early 1990s? 4 1 1 3 7 6 3.67 2.50 
2 
Campus decision makers had 
sufficient evidence of the possibility 
of enrollment declines through 
internal and external reports. 9 5 10 9 10 9 8.67 1.86 
3 
Decision makers in the Office of the 
Dean of the Commonwealth 
Education System at Darwin had a 
sufficient evidence of the possibility 
of enrollment declines through 
internal and external reports. 10 5 10 9 9 9 8.67 1.86 
4 
Campus decision makers fully 
understood the dimensions of the 
enrollment problems (economic 9 10 10 8 9 10 9.33 0.82 
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 Bennett Dunmore 
Mount 
Royal Scarborough Wadsworth  York Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
recession, declining demographics, 
etc.). 
5 
There was timely recognition and 
response by campus decision makers 
to the downward trend in enrollments. 6 8 10 9 10 9 8.67 1.51 
6 
There was timely recognition and 
response by decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES to the 
downward trend in enrollments. 2 3 6 6 9 9 5.83 2.93 
7 
The response of campus decision 
makers was based on an 
understanding of the available data 
and information to support decision 
making. 8 10 10 8 10 10 9.33 1.03 
8 
 The response of the decision makers 
in the Office of the Dean of the CES 
at Darwin was based on an 
understanding of the available data 
and information to support decision 
making. 4 3 5 6 9 9 6.00 2.53 
 Communications       
1 
The communication process between 
admissions officers and campus 
executive officers was open and 
timely in quantity and quality. 7 10 10 9 10 10 9.33 1.21 
2 
The communication process between 
campus admissions officers and 
decision makers in the Office of the 
Dean of the CES was open and timely 
in quantity and quality. 7 4 4 9 9 9 7.00 2.45 
3 
There was a constant flow of 
communications that facilitated 
discussion and insight between the 
campus admissions officer and the 5 10 10 8 10 10 8.83 2.04 
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 Bennett Dunmore 
Mount 
Royal Scarborough Wadsworth  York Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
campus executive officer. 
4 
Communication process from campus 
admissions officers to campus 
executive officers was frank and 
candid. 5 10 10 10 10 10 9.17 2.04 
5 
Personalities were more important 
than information or data in 
influencing decision making on your 
campus pertaining to enrollment 
declines and planning. 1 1 3 2 1 3 1.83 0.98 
6 
The communication process between 
campus enrollment officers and 
executive officers and decision 
makers in the Office of the Dean of 
the CES was open and timely in 
quantity and quality. NR NR NR NR NR NR  0.00 
7 
There was a constant flow of 
communications that facilitated 
discussion and insight between the 
campus executive officer and decision 
makers in the Office of the Dean of 
the CES. NR NR NR NR NR NR  0.00 
8 
The communication process from 
campus admissions and enrollment 
officers to campus executive officers 
was an important source of 
information for CES decision makers. NR NR NR NR NR NR  0.00 
9 
Personalities of campus executive 
officers were more important than 
information or data in influencing 
decision making pertaining to 
enrollment declines and planning. NR NR NR NR NR NR  0.00 
10 
Personalities of decision makers in 
the Office of the Dean of the CES 1 7 2 4 7 3 4.00 2.53 
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 Bennett Dunmore 
Mount 
Royal Scarborough Wadsworth  York Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
were more important than information 
or data in influencing decision 
making pertaining to university-wide 
enrollment issues and planning. 
 Information Seeking      
1 
Information was incomplete for 
effective decision making. 7 6 2 7 2 3 4.50 2.43 
2 
There were too much data and 
information for effective decision 
making. 1 4 1 4 1 3 2.33 1.51 
3 Access to information was difficult. 8 7 1 7 1 3 4.50 3.21 
4 
Appropriate information was 
available for effective decision 
making. 4 6 10 5 9 8 7.00 2.37 
5 
You believed that you were well 
trained to obtain and analyze data for 
admission and recruitment decision 
making. 6 10 10 7 10 9 8.67 1.75 
6 
External sources of information were 
actively sought. 5 9 10 9 8 8 8.17 1.72 
7 
Different individuals had access to 
different information and this affected 
decision making. 9 5 2 3 2 8 4.83 3.06 
8 
The prospect and application AIDAA 
report generator was an important 
source of information. 1 10 4 7 NA 9 6.20 4.17 
9 
Data and information were crucial for 
enrollment and recruitment decisions. 6 10 9 8 10 9 8.67 1.51 
10 
There was a need for the development 
of information reports that could be 
used for forecasting purposes. 9 10 6 7 10 7 8.17 1.72 
11 
Enrollment decision makers made 
appropriate interpretations of the data 
and information. 5 6 10 8 9 9 7.83 1.94 
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 Bennett Dunmore 
Mount 
Royal Scarborough Wadsworth  York Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Decision Making       
1 
The admission and enrollment 
management decision makers 
considered various alternatives prior 
to a decision. 7 9 10 8 10 9 8.83 1.17 
2 
Decisions were made that 
appropriately addressed the 
enrollment situation. 7 9 10 8 10 9 8.83 1.17 
3 
You believed that you had input or 
influence in the decision making 
processes of enrollment planning. 7 9 10 5 9 10 8.33 1.97 
4 
Campus admissions officers did have 
influence on decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES? 7 2 3 5 6 9 5.33 2.58 
5 
Campus enrollment officers did have 
influence on decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES? NR NR NR NR NR NR   
6 
Campus executive officers did have 
influence on decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the CES? 5 5 9 7 9 10 7.50 2.17 
7 
The decision making process was 
logical and orderly? 5 2 6 7 9 8 6.17 2.48 
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APPENDIX E 
 
DARWIN – COMMONWEALTH EDUCATION SYSTEM AND UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS OFFICE 
SURVEY RESULTS 
 
 
 
Darwin 
DM #1 
Darwin 
DM #2 
Darwin 
DM#3 
Darwin 
DM#4 
Darwin 
DM#5 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
Problem Recognition 
and Defining Problem 
       
1 Were the enrollment 
declines that your 
campus experienced 
significant in the early 
1990s? 9 8 9 3 NR 7.25 2.87 
2 Campus decision makers 
had sufficient evidence 
of the possibility of 
enrollment declines 
through internal and 
external reports. 10 NR 10 8 8 9.00 1.15 
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Darwin 
DM #1 
Darwin 
DM #2 
Darwin 
DM#3 
Darwin 
DM#4 
Darwin 
DM#5 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
3 Decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the 
Commonwealth 
Education System at 
Darwin had a sufficient 
evidence of the 
possibility of enrollment 
declines through internal 
and external reports. 10 10 10 10 8 9.60 0.89 
4 Campus decision makers 
fully understood the 
dimensions of the 
enrollment problems 
(economic recession, 
declining demographics, 
etc.). 8 3 9 9 8 7.40 2.51 
5 There was timely 
recognition and response 
by campus decision 
makers to the downward 
trend in enrollments 2 3 10 NR 5 5.00 3.56 
6 There was timely 
recognition and response 
by decision makers in 
the Office of the Dean of 
the CES to the 
downward trend in 
enrollments. 8 3 8 2 7 5.60 2.88 
7 The response of campus 
decision makers was 
based on an 
understanding of the 
available data and 
information to support 3 2 10 9 6 6.00 3.54 
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Darwin 
DM #1 
Darwin 
DM #2 
Darwin 
DM#3 
Darwin 
DM#4 
Darwin 
DM#5 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
decision making. 
8 The response of the 
decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the 
CES at Darwin was 
based on an 
understanding of the 
available data and 
information to support 
decision making. 8 NR 10 8 8 8.50 1.00 
 Communications 
Process  
       
1 The communication 
process between 
admissions officers and 
campus executive 
officers was open and 
timely in quantity and 
quality. NR NR NR NR NR  
2 The communication 
process between campus 
admissions officers and 
decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the 
CES was open and 
timely in quantity and 
quality. NR NR NR NR NR  
3 There was a constant 
flow of communications 
that facilitated 
discussion and insight 
between the campus 
admissions officer and NA NA NA NA NA 0.00 
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Darwin 
DM #1 
Darwin 
DM #2 
Darwin 
DM#3 
Darwin 
DM#4 
Darwin 
DM#5 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
the campus executive 
officer. 
4 Communication process 
from campus admissions 
officers to campus 
executive officers was 
frank and candid. NR NR NR NR NR  
5 Personalities were more 
important than 
information or data in 
influencing decision 
making on your campus 
pertaining to enrollment 
declines and planning. NR NR NR NR NR  
6 The communication 
process between campus 
enrollment officers and 
executive officers and 
decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the 
CES was open and 
timely in quantity and 
quality. 3 2 7 9 6 5.40 2.88 
7 There was a constant 
flow of communications 
that facilitated 
discussion and insight 
between the campus 
executive officer and 
decision makers in the 
Office of the Dean of the 
CES. 3 1 9 NR 6 4.75 3.50 
8 The communication 
process from campus 1 NR 8 NR 5 4.67 3.51 
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Darwin 
DM #1 
Darwin 
DM #2 
Darwin 
DM#3 
Darwin 
DM#4 
Darwin 
DM#5 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
admissions and 
enrollment officers to 
campus executive 
officers was an 
important source of 
information for CES 
decision makers. 
9 Personalities of campus 
executive officers were 
more important than 
information or data in 
influencing decision 
making pertaining to 
enrollment declines and 
planning. 7 4 5 NR 7 5.75 1.50 
10 Personalities of decision 
makers in the Office of 
the Dean of the CES 
were more important 
than information or data 
in influencing decision 
making pertaining to 
university-wide 
enrollment issues and 
planning. 3 4 4 NR 3 3.50 0.58 
 Information Seeking       
1 Information was 
incomplete for effective 
decision making. 1 6 3 9 6 5.00 3.08 
2 There were too much 
data and information for 
effective decision 
making. 1 6 8 5 3 4.60 2.70 
3 Access to information 1 3 3 8 6 4.20 2.77 
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Darwin 
DM #1 
Darwin 
DM #2 
Darwin 
DM#3 
Darwin 
DM#4 
Darwin 
DM#5 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
was difficult. 
4  Appropriate information 
was available for 
effective decision 
making. 8 6 8 7 7 7.20 0.84 
5 You believed that you 
were well trained to 
obtain and analyze data 
for admission and 
recruitment decision 
making. 9 6 8 3 10 7.20 2.77 
6 External sources of 
information were 
actively sought. 6 2 9 5 8 6.00 2.74 
7 Different individuals had 
access to different 
information and this 
affected decision 
making. 5 5 5 7 5 5.40 0.89 
8 The prospect and 
application AIDAA 
report generator was an 
important source of 
information. 8 7 8 7 7 7.40 0.55 
9 Data and information 
were crucial for 
enrollment and 
recruitment decisions. 7 7 8 8 10 8.00 1.22 
10 There was a need for the 
development of 
information reports that 
could be used for 
forecasting purposes. 3 7 6 8 7 6.20 1.92 
11 Enrollment decision 3 3 8 6 7 5.40 2.30 
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Darwin 
DM #1 
Darwin 
DM #2 
Darwin 
DM#3 
Darwin 
DM#4 
Darwin 
DM#5 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
makers made appropriate 
interpretations of the 
data and information. 
 Decision Making 
Process       
1 The admission and 
enrollment management 
decision makers 
considered various 
alternatives prior to a 
decision. 6 7 9 7 6 7.00 1.22 
2 Decisions were made 
that appropriately 
addressed the enrollment 
situation. 3 4 4 3 6 4.00 1.22 
3 You believed that you 
had input or influence in 
the decision making 
processes of enrollment 
planning. 8 2 8 3 9 6.00 3.24 
4 Campus admissions 
officers did have 
influence on decision 
makers in the Office of 
the Dean of the CES? NR NR NR NR NR  
5 Campus enrollment 
officers did have 
influence on decision 
makers in the Office of 
the Dean of the CES? 3 5 6 NR 6 5.00 1.41 
6 Campus executive 
officers did have 
influence on decision 
makers in the Office of 3 3 8 NR 8 5.50 2.89 
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Darwin 
DM #1 
Darwin 
DM #2 
Darwin 
DM#3 
Darwin 
DM#4 
Darwin 
DM#5 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
the Dean of the CES? 
7 The decision making 
process was logical and 
orderly? 6 7 6 3 7 5.80 1.64 
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APPENDIX F 
T TEST OF SURVEY RESULTS 
 
Survey Question  
Item # 
 
Item Text 
 
Group 
 
n 
 
Mean 
Stand 
Dev. 
 
t 
 
p 
Admission 
Officers 
 
10 
 
4.73 
 
2.69 
-3.29 .005 
 
Problem Question 5 There was timely 
recognition and 
response by campus 
decision makers to 
the downward trend 
in enrollments. 
CEO’s 6 8.67 1.51 -3.87 .002 
Admissions Officers 11 4.64 2.76 -3.96 .001 Problem Question 7 The response of 
campus decision 
makers was based 
on an understanding 
of the available data 
and information to 
support decision 
making. 
CEO’s 6 9.33 1.03 -5.02 .000 
Admissions Officers 10 4.80 2.62 -3.34 .005 Communications 
Question 3 
 
There was a 
constant flow of 
communications 
CEO’s 6 9.00 2.00 -3.61 .003 
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Survey Question  
Item # 
 
Item Text 
 
Group 
 
n 
 
Mean 
Stand 
Dev. 
 
t 
 
p 
that facilitated 
discussion and 
insight between the 
campus admissions 
officer and the 
campus executive 
officer. 
 
 
Admissions Officers 11 6.55 2.77 3.98 .001 Communications 
Question 5 
Personalities were 
more important 
than information or 
data in influencing 
decision making on 
your campus 
pertaining to 
enrollment declines 
and planning. 
CEO’s 6 1.83 .983 5.08 .000 
Admissions Officers 10 7.70 2.41 2.93 .011 Communications 
Question 10 
Personalities of 
decision makers in 
the Office of the 
Dean of the CES 
were more 
important than 
information or data 
in influencing 
decision making 
pertaining to 
university-wide 
enrollment issues 
and planning. 
CEO’s 6 4.00 2.53 2.88 .016 
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Survey Question  
Item # 
 
Item Text 
 
Group 
 
n 
 
Mean 
Stand 
Dev. 
 
t 
 
p 
Information Question 6 External sources of 
information were 
actively sought. 
Admissions Officers 11 4.36 2.62 -3.18 .006 
Admissions Officers 11 4.91 2.62 -3.44 .004 Decision making 
Question #2 
Decisions were 
made that 
appropriately 
addressed the 
enrollment 
situation. 
CEO’s 6 8.83 1.17 -4.25 .001 
Admissions Officers 11 5.64 2.91 -2.02 .062 Decision making 
Question #3 
You believed that 
you had input or 
influence in the 
decision making 
processes of 
enrollment 
planning. 
CEO’s 6 8.33 1.96 -2.27 .040 
 
Admissions Officers 10 3.90 2.13 -4.06 .002 Problem Question #8 The response of the 
decision makers in 
the Office of the 
Dean of the CES at 
Darwin was based 
on an understanding 
of the available data 
and information to 
support decision 
making. 
Darwin  4 8.50 1.00 -5.48 .000 
Admissions Officers 10 7.70 2.41 3.37 .006 Communications 
Question #10 
Personalities of 
decision makers in 
the Office of the 
Dean of the CES 
were more 
Darwin  4 3.50 .577 5.16 .000 
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Survey Question  
Item # 
 
Item Text 
 
Group 
 
n 
 
Mean 
Stand 
Dev. 
 
t 
 
p 
important than 
information or data 
in influencing 
decision making 
pertaining to 
university-wide 
enrollment issues 
and planning. 
 
APPENDIX G 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
The interview questions were based on the survey questionnaire and topics and were 
meant to be as open-ended as possible.  The enrollment management position of the interview 
respondent and the flow of the interview process influenced the questions that were ultimately 
asked of the organization members.  Listed below are some of the questions that were asked.  
This list is not inclusive of all questions asked of the enrollment management organization 
member.  
 
1. Was the decision making process random or structured? 
2. Was communication open or closed? 
3. What information was available to inform decision making? 
4. Was the information valuable? 
5. Was there too much or too little information? 
6. What was the degree of coordination in the organization structure for decision making? 
7. Did decision making achieve coherence and reduce equivocation? 
8. Was decision making typified more by clarity and consistency or by ambiguity and 
inconsistency? 
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9. Were decisions the outcomes of actions committed by individual actors or to the actions of 
a team or an organizational culture?  
10. Were the decision makers overwhelmed by information and the complexity of the 
decision situation? 
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APPENDIX H 
SURVEY COVER LETTERS 
 
Greetings, my name is Tom Riley.  I am conducting a study for a doctoral dissertation, titled 
“Information, Decision Making and Enrollment Management in a Public Research University: A 
Case Study Analysis Using Bounded Rationality Theory.”   The purpose of my communication 
is to invite you to be a participant and agree to take a survey and possibly be interviewed. You 
must be 18 years of age or older. 
 
The dissertation topic will be an examination of the enrollment dilemma at Darwin University in 
the time period of 1990 to 1995.  The focus will be on how information was managed, 
communicated and used to make organizational decisions for enrollment planning and 
management. 
 
It will take you approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete the survey.  The length of the 
interview will be approximately 30 to 60 minutes.   The survey can be returned to me via e-mail 
or U.S. Mail.  If you would prefer the U.S. Mail, I can forward a self-addressed postage-paid 
envelope. 
  
The interview will be audio recorded.  The recordings will be stored at the residence of the 
principal investigator.  The recordings will be destroyed by 2010.  Only the principal investigator 
will have access to the recordings.  Only the principal investigator will know your identity.  If 
this research is published, no information that would identify you will be written.  If using 
internet technology, confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology 
used.  Specifically, no guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data sent via the 
Internet by any third parties.    
 
Your participation is voluntary. You can end your participation at any time.  You do not have to 
answer any questions you do not want to answer.  Your name and identity will not be associated 
with your answers in any way, and your responses will be confidentially treated.  There are no 
known risks to participating in this research study. 
 
If you have questions, contact me (412-XXX-XXXX/ tjr3@darwin.edu) or my dissertation 
adviser, Dr. William B. Thomas (412-648-7173/ wbt@pitt.edu).  This survey was reviewed and 
approved by the Darwin University Office for Research Protections on 08/02/04 and the 
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University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board.  If you have questions about your rights as a 
research participant, you can all the Darwin University Office for Research Protections (XXX-
XXX-XXXX).   
 
If receiving this via email, please print off this form for your records. Would you be willing to 
participate?   
 
Thank you, 
 
 
Thomas J. Riley 
University of Pittsburgh 
School of Education 
Administrative and Policy Studies 
 
 
 
January 31, 2006 
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John M. Doe, Ph.D. 
100 Main Street 
Frostbite Falls, MN  99999 
 
Dear Dr. Doe: 
 
This is a follow-up to our e-mail exchange and my request for your participation in my 
dissertation research.  I had informed you that I had designed a survey instrument and 
requested that you complete the survey and possibly be interviewed as well.   
 
I am sending the essential documents for your participation in my dissertation survey.  The 
documents include a cover letter, the survey and a consent form.  The consent form is 
required by both the Darwin University Office of Research Protections and the University 
of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board.  The use of a survey and possible interview are 
considered human participation in a social science research study.  Therefore, you must be 
a voluntary participant and you may withdraw at any time.  Your signature is required on 
the Informed Consent for Social Science Research form.  The various documents can be e-
mailed to you.  The e-mailing includes two MS Word file attachments. 
 
If you would like to know more about the dissertation topic, I would be happy to send the 
overview document to you. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
 
Thomas J. Riley 
University of Pittsburgh 
School of Education 
Administrative and Policy Studies 
 
 
encl. 
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